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TITLE: DAILY SITUATION REPORTS ON CRISIS
IN JORDAN SEPTEMBER 1970.

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PART B

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Middle East Crisis

SITREP at 1800 on 20 September, 1970

(all times referred to are BST)

RECEIVED IN REGISTRY No. 10 - 2 OCT 1970
NES 1/10

I: Jordan

Situation in Amman

Amman Embassy communications

The Embassy reported at 0707 that their emergency power unit was out of action. Contact with Amman has been limited to very short exchanges. During the earlier part of the day the Embassy could transmit only en clair traffic. They now have limited cypher facilities. An emergency generator is to be flown to Beirut tonight for onward transmission by the earliest possible means to Amman.

Situation in Amman

2. Mopping up appears to be continuing.

Syrian Activity

3. There have been conflicting reports about a Syrian incursion at brigade strength in northern Jordan. Amman radio announced early this morning that the Syrian force had been repulsed. The latest communication on the subject from Amman (at 1512) reiterated an earlier request for intervention. However the source of this telegram is not known and we have asked H.M. Embassy Amman for clarification.

4. The U.S. Embassy have told us that they have received a request from the King that they should issue a condemnation of the invasion and put out a statement that intervention from an

outside power could not be tolerated and would necessitate international action. The French Embassy have told us that they have a request for condemnation in broadly similar terms, but which would be issued by the Four powers (U.K., U.S., France, Soviet Union).

Foreigners in Amman

5. C.B.O. Bill Pink managed to reach the Intercontinental Hotel and to bring back a list of all foreigners, who, with one exception, are reported to be well. The exception, a Swede, had been removed to hospital with a minor bullet wound. The relevant Embassies in London have been informed of the names of their nationals. All members of the Berne group subsequently expressed their warm admiration for Pink's action (Berne telno. 299). A telegram from H.M. Embassy at 11.50 reported that all members of the Embassy staff had been located and were well. The Ambassador has not yet been able to report on members of the British community.

Embassy Staff

6. Arrangements are in hand to send out additional staff to relieve temporarily those who have recently been under pressure.

Exchange of Messages between King Hussein and the Prime Minister

7. The King sent a message to Mr. Heath expressing his appreciation of "Britain's evident moral support" (Amman telex conference 1700 19 September). In reply (F.C.O. telno. 356 to Amman) Mr. Heath told the King of H.M.G.'s distress at the suffering caused by the fighting. They were taking urgent action in response to the King's appeal for medical relief, and were grateful for his assurances that he was doing everything to secure the release of the hostages.

II: Medical/

II: Medical Relief

8. The King has appealed to the British, American, French and Soviet governments for medical assistance to cope with casualties (civilian and fedayeen as well as Jordanian troops) who may number as many as 5,000 (telex conference at 1700 and 1930 hours).
9. H.M. Consul General in Geneva has passed a message from King Hussein to the ICRC asking them to act as co-ordinators for the relief arrangements (Geneva telno. 47). An ICRC representative has told H.M. Consul General that the ICRC are considering this problem today, 20 September and will let us know their decision as soon as possible. The Americans and the French have agreed to this co-ordination.
10. A statement issued by 10 Downing Street at midnight announced that H.M.G. were ready to respond to King Hussein's appeal as soon as possible. They were in touch with the ICRC about co-ordinating help. Medical and other relief supplies were being made ready in this country (FCO telno. 35 to C.G. Geneva).
11. Lord Carrington has instructed the Ministry of Defence to give all possible assistance. The British Red Cross have undertaken to warn the Disaster Emergency Committee that an appeal may soon be forthcoming from the Jordanian government via the ICRC. The Treasury have been warned that a financial commitment is likely. The results of a meeting on the subject of medical aid held this morning under the auspices of the M.O.D. are summarised in FCO telegrams nos 36 and 37/^{to}C.G. Geneva.

III: Hostages

12. There is no further news on the hostages. The King has reiterated his warning that his troops should be most careful to avoid harming them. In his message to the Prime Minister,

King Hussein assured him that the Jordan government were continuing to do everything possible to secure the release of the hostages. This was reflected in the statement issued from No. 10 at midnight on 19 September.

Middle East CrisisSITREP at 2300 on 20 September, 1970

(all times referred to are BST)

RECEIVED IN REGISTRY No. 10 - 2 OCT 1970 NES 11/10

Amman Embassy Communications

The essential parts for the emergency generator are due to arrive at Beirut 12.40 local (approx 10.30 Z) 21 September (FCO tel. no. 554 to Nicosia).

2. Reported at 21.10 BST by Head of Shift that they were working Picolo to Amman both ways. Engine cooling by buckets. Keep cypher traffic to minimum. Duty engineer advising Amman how to plug. At 21.20 agreed Amman could close until 0600 BST since cooling arrangements arduous. Can be raised if necessary on Mabel.

Situation in Amman

3. A pool newspaper report (Amman tel. 621) said King Hussein appeared to be winning the Battle of Amman but the Fedayeen are holding out in pockets in the hope of Syrians coming. Estimates of dead and wounded run into thousands. The Army report that about 1000 commandos have surrendered in the fighting, and several Fedayeen leaders have been captured, including Ibrahim Bakr an executive committee member of the P.L.O.

Syrian activity

4. Two Syrian armoured brigades reported inside Jordanian territory advancing towards Irbid (Amman tel. no. 623) King Hussein doubts if they ^{Jordanian} can hold Irbid long; Hunters cannot operate after dark but remnants of Forty Brigade will delay as long as possible (Amman (new series tels) No.3). SISCO's opinion was that with darkness falling it was unlikely there would be more clear information till morning (Washington 2773).

5. The King has asked for moral diplomatic support (Amman tel no. 4), public condemnation and threat of international steps. Appeal delayed by cypher snags. Syrian troops massing. Call for intervention by H.M.G. and U.S.A. may come soon. King now asks for Israeli air strike now.

Embassy Staff

6. All members of staff located and unharmed (Amman tel. 622).

Medical Relief

7. ICRC view is that foreign military uniforms would undoubtedly mean death for the hostages (Geneva tel. no.48). They insist on civilian cover and propose all military personnel should have civilian papers if possible issued by their national Red Cross society. Aircraft must have ICRC markings.

8. Boisart reported to have reached Amman from Beirut by air today and to have returned after a few hours. ICRC have not received a report from him.

State Department Statement

9. Secretary of State Rogers stated publicly that tank forces had invaded Jordan from Syria during the night.

10. The United States condemned this irresponsible and imprudent intervention from Syria into Jordan and called on the Syrian Government to end it immediately.

State Department demarche to Soviet Charge

11. Sisco handed note to Soviet chargé to effect that the situation was being further and dangerously aggravated by the intervention into Jordanian territory of Armoured forces from Syria and concentration of further Syrian forces on Jordanian border.

12. U.S. Government called upon Soviet Government to impress

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on Government of Syria grave danger of its present course of action and need to withdraw force without delay and to desist from further intervention.

H.M.G.'s demarche to Soviet Ambassador

13. The P.U.S. summoned the Soviet Ambassador at 2100 (BST) and spoke in similar terms to Americans.

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RECEIVED IN REGISTRY No. 10 - 2 OCT 1970
NEJ 1/10

(17)

Middle East Crisis

SITREP at 0700 hours on 21 September, 1970

(all times referred to are BST)

I : Situation in Amman

The curfew has been lifted in some parts of Amman, and a few people have been seen on the streets. Shelling continues however against Jebel Ashrafiya and there are reports of fighting in the Husayn and Wahdat camps.

2. A pool newspaper report passed by the Embassy, (Amman tel 621) said King Hussein appeared to be winning the Battle of Amman but the Fedayeen are holding out in pockets in the hope of Syrians coming. Estimates of dead and wounded run into thousands. The Army report that about 1000 commandos have surrendered in the fighting, and several Fedayeen leaders have been captured, including Ibrahim Bakr an executive committee member of the P.L.O.

3. The American Embassy is experiencing considerable communications difficulties and is out of touch with the King. We are passing messages where possible. The Americans are also worried about the security of their Embassy.

II : Syrian Incursion

Military Situation

4. The general situation appears to be deteriorating rapidly. A force of Syrian tanks estimated at between two and three brigades crossed the border into Jordan. Irbid has fallen and the King believes the armoured columns are now heading for Amman.

5. The Iraqi 6 Armoured Brigade normally stationed at Deraa is moving to Mafraq, but they may be leaving Jordan with the rest

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of the Iraqi forces (Tel Aviv telno. 201700Z). The King has been in touch with the Iraqis over difficulties caused by their forces surrounding an Iraqi air base. (Amman telno. 623) and has disposed his forces about Amman in a position of all-round defence in case the Iraqis try to intervene (Amman 202020Z).

King's Appeals for Help

6. Messages from the King passed by our Embassy in Amman called for "Israeli or other air intervention or threat thereof" (Amman telno. 201000Z and "moral diplomatic support, public condemnation and threat of international steps" (Amman telno. 4). Letters signed by the King and addressed to H.M.G., the Americans, Russians and the French called for maximum pressure on the Syrian Government to withdraw their forces immediately (Amman telno. 627).

7. The King telephoned the American Ambassador in Amman at 0200 hours with a personal message for President Nixon. After reference to the deteriorating situation he requested "immediate physical intervention, both land and air". He said immediate air strikes on invading forces from any quarter plus air cover were imperative. The message foreshadowed a possible early request for the landing of troops and asked what notice would be required to respond to such a request. The King said he was unable to contact the British Ambassador and asked that the message should be passed to H.M.G. (Washington telegram No. 2778 inter alia).

8. Dr. Kissinger subsequently spoke to Mr. Freeman in Washington and to Mr. Moon at No. 10. He said that the U.S. government were still discussing their course. Their only decision so far had been to increase certain readiness measures such as to alert certain troops. They would not take any precipitate decisions

/and would

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and would keep H.M.G. informed (FCO tel No. 2104 to Washington).

Security Council

9. The Jordanian Permanent Representative was instructed to call for a Security Council meeting. The Secretary of State recorded (U.K. MIS New York telno. 1978) that the U.S., French and Soviet missions and even the Jordanian representative himself were not in favour of a meeting.

10. But the Americans and French agreed that if the situation were really serious it would be almost essential for the Council to meet. In view of the latest developments, which post-date U.K. MIS New York tel. No. 1978, the Prime Minister has agreed that there should be an urgent meeting of the Council at which we should propose a resolution and should go along with our friends if possible, but alone if necessary. The P.U.S. has spoken to Mr. Graham in New York who will put this to the Secretary of State.

Earlier U.S./ British Action

11. On the Prime Minister's instructions the Permanent Under-Secretary had earlier summoned the Soviet Ambassador and told him that H.M.G. hoped the Soviet Government would urge the Syrians to withdraw (FCO tel 803 to Moscow). The Secretary of State made statements to the press at London Airport. U. K. MIS telno. 1977 reports his press conference on arrival in New York.

12. Mr. Rogers made a statement condemning the Syrian intervention. Mr. Sisco summoned the Soviet Chargé d'Affaires and handed him a Note (Washington telnos. 2773 and 2774).

/III

III : U.A.R. Activity

12. Cairo have reported (telno. 1025) the texts of telegrams sent on 19 September by Nasser to King Hussein and Yasir Arafat, and subsequently published in Al Ahram. The message to the King asks for urgent efforts towards a cease fire both for the sake of those involved, and because of fears that the U.S. may exploit the situation. It says that General Sadiq is at the King's disposal to help bring a cease fire about.

13. The message to Arafat opens similarly with a reference to General Sadiq, and goes on to express support for the People of Palestine and the resistance movement. At the same time it regrets the spilling of Arab blood - Jordanian or Palestinian. The U.A.R. attitude will be determined in the light of the response to its initiative.

14. Ahram reports that the King announced a cease fire at 1800 hours (local time) but does not say who broke it. It also attacks the Iraqi government for undermining the cease fire and reports Bourguiba's proposal for an Arab Summit Conference to discuss the Jordan crisis in the presence of Hussein and Arafat as having been accepted by Hussein, Qadafi and Boumedienne.

15. A subsequent telegram (Cairo telno. 1041) reports Jordan as having asked for an urgent meeting of the Arab League to consider its complaint against Syria. However consultations between the governments concerned may result in the withdrawal of the Jordanian request.

IV : British Embassy Amman

16. The generator was put out of action by a hit early on 20 September and although Piccolo is now back on steam, the

/generator

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generator has to be cooled with buckets of water and traffic has to be kept to a minimum. Essential parts to effect the necessary repairs have been despatched and will arrive in Beirut at 0930 today. Onward transmission will be effected at the earliest opportunity.

17. All members of the Embassy staff have been located and are unharmed. According to an informal message from the Embassy this morning, one of their two wireless operators is sick.

V : Medical Relief

ICRC

18. H.M. Consul-General has followed up his approach to the ICRC on 19 September with a formal note requesting the ICRC on behalf of the Government of Jordan to coordinate a medical aid operation to Amman as soon as possible (C.G. Geneva telno. 47). The French have agreed, as did the U.S. yesterday, that the ICRC should undertake this coordination.

19. The ICRC met yesterday but having expressed gratitude for the U.K. offer of assistance came to no decision about the type of operation they should undertake. H.M. Consul General in telephoning this news to us at 0020 suggested that they would wait and see how events turned out in Jordan before taking a decision.

20. In the meantime, an ICRC plane has flown from Beirut to Amman and back to unload medical supplies. It is to make another run today with further supplies and 6 medical staff.

21. M. Boisard was on the plane and has reported that, in his view, the need is for emergency medical supplies rather than more substantial items such as field hospitals which could not

at the moment be easily transported from the airport.

22. A U.A.R. plane which landed about the same time as the one from the ICRC also delivered medical supplies, but was fired at both while landing and taking off.

U.K. Action

23. D.O.C. have 4 Hercules aircraft on stand by. Two have already left Lydda for Amotiri carrying a field ambulance section (13 men), a field surgical team (9 men), the light section of a field hospital (24 men) and Royal Signals staff to set up a communications link in case U.K. personnel are sent into Jordan. Both planes are also each carrying half a ton of miscellaneous medical supplies including plasma. There was not room for a B.B.C. camera crew.

24. The British Red Cross have started to alert civilian medical personnel who might man the field hospital if Ministers decide that we should not provide Services medical staff. This will take a few days.

25. The ICRC are however adamant (see C.G. Geneva telno. 48) that all personnel must be there in civilian guise. They think that the arrival of medical personnel on a military basis would bring certain death to the hostages.

U.S. Action

26. The U.S. propose to provide two mobile hospitals, but with minimal U.S. staffing.

/VI

VI ; Hostages

27. There has been no further news on the hostages.

VII : Berne Group

28. The Berne Group did not meet yesterday.

VIII : Further Hijackings

29. In the light of the report from Berne on 19 September that further hijackings might be expected by persons travelling on the passports of those in the previously hijacked planes, BOAC have been given a list, prepared with the help of the Americans, of those persons and the details of their passports. BOAC promised to pass this list on immediately to their own offices and first thing on Monday to ICAO and/or IATA. We understand that the Secretary-General of Interpol has also been given a copy.

IX : Miss Khaled

30. Nothing to report.

Middle East CrisisSINREP at 0700 on 2. September, 1970

(all times referred to are BST)

RECEIVED IN REGISTRY No. 10 2 OCT 1970 NET 1/10
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I : Situation in Amman

The pool report for A.P. and U.P.I. (reference Amman 211530Z) reports that sporadic fighting continues. Amman reported in their 1730 telex conference that the King has ordered a cease-fire and that he hopes to lift the curfew for at least part of today. It remains to be seen whether the Fedayeen are prepared to follow the King's lead. Israeli sources (Tel Aviv FOH 211430Z) similarly report Amman quiet. The 1330 telex conference reported that Jordanian armour is deployed on the outskirts of Amman to counter any Iraqi/Syrian action.

II : Situation in North Jordan

2. Israeli sources (Tel Aviv FOH 211430Z) report Syrian forces in the Irbid area as consisting of two armoured brigades and two armoured regiments with a strength of about 300 tanks and 80 artillery pieces. This force is reported as digging in south and west of Irbid. The total Jordanian strength in the area (40th Brigade) is estimated at about 220 tanks. The Iraqi forces do not appear to have moved further west. The Syrians have denied that any of these forces are Syrian, and claim that they are Palestinian units based in Syria.

3. Amman reported (in their 1730 telex conference) that Mirciwid Tel had called an hour earlier with a message from the King. This confirmed that Irbid had fallen and that it, together with numerous surrounding villages, had been occupied. However Tel

/doubted

doubted whether the Syrians would advance to Amman, although if they and/or the Iraqis wished to, they could be on the outskirts in a matter of hours.

4. Tel's report however conflicted with a conversation with the Palace reported in the same conference which suggested that an armoured column had set off towards Amman but had been intercepted by the Jordanian Air Force.

5. The likelihood of Israeli intervention against the Syrians has been discussed in the day's telex conferences.

III : Diplomatic Activity

Security Council

6. A telegram issued to Ukmis New York confirming the Prime Minister's view that H.M.G. should work for a Security Council meeting (FCO telno. 1192).

7. Mr. Rogers told H.M. Ambassador, Washington that he was not against a meeting in principle, but doubted whether it was the best time for one. If the Israelis decided to move against Syria, a resolution might be embarrassing (Washington telno. 2783).

8. The Secretary of State agreed that the Security Council should act soon if it was to act at all. But effective action would depend on agreement among the Permanent Members and he doubted if this existed (Ukmis New York telno. 1980).

9. Ukmis New York telno. 1984 and 1985 report the line Mr. Hayden is taking with the press.

10. The Americans asked us not to take any irrevocable step vis-à-vis the Security Council, pending the outcome of a meeting in Washington which Mr. Disco was holding and which was considering all possible contingencies. The U.S. representative's instructions

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are to discourage a Council meeting for the time being (Ukmis New York telno. 1981).

11. The French remain strongly in favour of four-power action. Their reservations about Security Council action stem not only from their concern at the lack of effectiveness of U.N. action; they are probably also looking to their future interests in the Arab world if King Hussein does not survive (Paris telno. 861).

Other Diplomatic Activity

12. The Jordanian Ambassador called on Sir P. Adams to ask for diplomatic support. H.M. Ambassador, Moscow spoke to Vice Minister Kozyrev to reinforce earlier representations to the Russians in London that the Soviet Government should urge the Syrians to withdraw their forces from Jordan (Moscow telno. 1084).

King's further Appeal for Assistance

13. The King appealed to France, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union and the United States, as Permanent Members of the Security Council, to do all they could to halt the invasion and to secure the withdrawal of Syrian forces from Jordan (telex conference at 1730). To ensure that the governments concerned had received the appeal Ukmis New York were asked to communicate copies of the text to the Ambassadors of the other three powers (Ukmis telno. 1206). Additionally this text was passed to the Soviet Embassy here (Ukmis telno. 805 to Moscow).

Prime Minister's proposed message to Nasser

14. The Prime Minister is consulting the Secretary of State on asking him, to the text of a proposed message to President Nasser, to use his influence at the Arab summit conference to secure the release of /the hostages

the hostages (FCO telnos. 1215 and 1216 to Uthman New York).

Arab Summit

15. According to radio reports King Hussein and the Iraqi and Algerian Heads of State will not be attending the summit meeting and there is some doubt about the Syrian.

IV : Reactions outside Jordan

Libya

16. Tripoli telno. 1326 reports a statement by the Libyan Government agreeing to the holding of a summit conference in Cairo and suggesting a joint Libyan/Algerian force to keep the peace in Jordan. They consider that Hussein has 24 hours to see sense. If the above points are not met, Libya will take unilateral action as it sees fit.

U.A.R.

17. Cairo report (telno. 1044) that with the passage of time, the U.A.R. attitude is hardening in favour of the guerillas and against King Hussein. The U.A.R. wishes to avoid foreign intervention in Jordan, and to this end is playing down reports of Syrian intervention. Sir R. Beaumont considers that any intervention with U.K. or U.S. blessing would have very serious consequences in Egypt.

Iraq

18. Baghdad reports (telno. 644) that the Baghdad press thinks that 10,000 British troops are on stand-by in Cyprus, that the Jordanian regime has been installed to destroy the Palestine resistance, and that the worry about U.S. citizens in Jordan is merely a casus belli to justify military intervention. Mr. Hawley ascribes these views (Baghad telno. 645) to the

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inherent Iraqi tendency to see everything in conspiratorial terms.

Syria

19. Tel Aviv telno. 882 reports that Arafat is said to be in Damascus.

U.S.S.R.

20. Pravda suggests (Moscow telno. 1083) that tension is being heightened by U.S. and U.K. military preparations in the Mediterranean. U.K. troops are said to have been sent to Cyprus. There is also speculation about U.S. or Israeli intervention.

V : H.M. Embassy

21. By pouring water from buckets on the radiator of their generator and with the aid of a portable fan, the Embassy has managed to maintain communications; the sick C.B.O. is now understood to be basically all right. Spares for the generator are now waiting in Beirut. Attempts are being made to get them, together with an additional C.B.O. and a spare generator from Beirut, on to Amman.

22. A member of the Embassy staff has now been able, with the aid of an army vehicle, to see all members of the Embassy community (see 1330 telex conference) who are all well. The Ambassador has also been able to strengthen his staff in the Embassy (telno. 632) by bringing in a Third Secretary and to relieve one member of the Registry staff with another.

VI : Evacuation

23. H.M. Ambassador has now recommended that the British Community should be evacuated at the earliest opportunity and thinks that it is no longer wise for the community simply to keep its head down during the fighting. There appear to be three possible routes -
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over the Allenby Bridge into Israel, by air from Amman and by plane or ship out of Aqaba. Of these the last seems most likely and the King sees no difficulty about security and transport. H.M. Ambassador will let us know the next move in due course. A Ministerial committee discussed evacuation yesterday.

24. The Quai d'Orsay have been informed of our views on evacuation, but are unaware of any similar proposal for the French community (Paris telno. 862). They will however keep in touch. Similarly Mr. Rogers discussed the problem with Mr. Freeman yesterday (Washington telno. 2783). The U.S. Ambassador in Amman does not consider the time ripe for evacuation, and fears it might damage the King's prestige.

25. The British Community have been warned to stand by for evacuation at a moment's notice (see 1330 telex). In the event of evacuation, the Ambassador proposes to retain his Counsellor, the Defence Attaché, a First Secretary, a Third Secretary and the Third Secretary (Administration) plus a few others.

26. The party for evacuation would include something over 100 British, 100 journalists and such other foreigners as can be found and got out of Amman.

VII : Medical Relief

ICRC

27. The ICRC have accepted the task of coordination of offers from national Red Cross societies and governments. Acceptance of individual offers would be subject to:-

- (a) no discrimination in medical care for all victims;
- (b) personnel and transport wearing the Red Cross emblem
(no military markings);

/ (c)

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(c) all personnel wearing civilian clothing (no weapons);
and

(d) all costs of personnel and supplies being borne by
the governments concerned.

28. Action would be directed from Geneva, with an operational
base in Amman and an auxiliary base in Beirut (C.G. Geneva telno. 51).

29. The ICRC have asked for further information about H.M.G.'s
offer (C.G. Geneva telno. 52). H.M. Consul General, Geneva has
been instructed to stress to the ICRC the urgency of getting supplies
and personnel to Jordan (FCO telno. 51 to Geneva).

British Contribution

30. R.A.F. aircraft have been transporting to Akrotiri overnight
the light section of a field hospital (66 personnel, 50 beds), an
air evacuation unit (23 personnel) and a small medical administrative
headquarters. A half ton of medical supplies from official sources
as well as donations of drugs and hypodermic syringes from the
British Red Cross and other relief organisations are also on their
way to Cyprus.

31. The Director General of the British Red Cross (who is at
present in Geneva) is to be consulted on the issue of civilian
papers to military personnel (FCO telno. 51 to Geneva).

U.S. Views

32. The Americans are telling the ICRC that they favour three
routes for getting this aid into Jordan - over Israel, over Turkey/
Iran/Saudi Arabia, and over Syria. They expect the ICRC to arrange
overflights, but they think they will be better placed than the
ICRC to get the agreement of Turkey, Iran and Saudi Arabia.

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VIII : Hostages - Berne Group

Hostages

33. There is no further news on the whereabouts or fate of the hostages.

34. The ICRC have said that in the event of the hostages falling into Jordanian hands and being released, the ICRC would arrange for an aircraft to take them out of Jordan (C.G. Geneva telno. 20).

Berne Group

35. The Group met at 0830 to consider a message from Boissier in Beirut in which he said it was essential that he should be authorised to discuss the question of detainees in Israel hands. The Group agreed that a reply should be sent asking him to maintain contact with the PFLP (although the Group still had doubts about the standing of the contacts). He should continue to press for access to and for a full list of the hostages and for a detailed statement of PFLP demands (Berne telno. 301).

36. The Berne Group are to meet again this evening (22 September) to consider a further message from Boissier which contained the text of the PFLP's reply to the Group's statement of 19 September. The PFLP reply, which is unhelpful and propagandistic in tone, states inter alia that the Front "is not ready to hear anything except the acceptance in principle of PFLP conditions" and holds the Five responsible for any harm the hostages may suffer (Berne telno. 302). Mr. West has asked for instructions. Boissier is returning today to Berne via Geneva.

Israeli Attitude

37. H.M. Ambassador, Tel Aviv has repeated his belief that the Israelis are only likely to be moved by pressure with which the Americans are fully and strongly associated (Tel Aviv telno. 883).

Middle East CrisisSITREP at 0700 on 23 September, 1970

(all times referred to are BST)
unless otherwise stated

RECEIVED IN REGISTRY No. 10
NEJ 1/10

I : The Military SituationAmman

The curfew was lifted for a short time during yesterday morning, but continued Fedayeen action necessitated its reimposition. Beirut telno. 488 suggests that trouble around Amman airport should be expected today.

North Jordan

2. Both the Iraqi and Syrian troops have moved positions, but not so far as to significantly alter the military situation.
3. Israeli sources (FOH 220830Z from Tel Aviv) report Syrian tank strength down to 180-200. There are however reinforcements to the north. Logistic movements have continued. Morale on the Jordanian side is said to be high. Reports of defections from the 40th Brigade are discounted.
4. Tel Aviv FOH 221140Z reports that Iraqi forces have been probing until they made contact and came under artillery fire.

South Jordan

5. Amman tel. No. 639 reports that the Jordanian Army has cleared all resistance to the south except in Madaba.

Israeli Forces

6. Tel Aviv have reported (tel. No. 886) that a considerable redeployment of Israeli forces northwards has taken place, but Mr. Barnes does not consider (tel. No. 887) that this necessarily indicates Israeli intervention. He suggests four reasons for these moves:

- (i) defensive action in case fighting spreads;
- (ii) a warning to Syria, should their penetration into Jordan increase;
- (iii) preparations to force Syrian withdrawal;
- (iv) to ensure that if Jordan is carved up, Israel gets a slice.

No official information has been forthcoming.

The King's View

7. The King has expressed his disappointment (Amman tel No. 039) at the lack of external intervention on his side, and has pointed out that as long as the Syrians remain in North Jordan, they will remain a permanent inducement to the Iraqis to act against his régime, and a source of support to the rebels in Amman and elsewhere.

II : Diplomatic Activity

United Nations

8. UK Mis New York's telegram No. 1998 reports that the Secretary of State saw the Permanent Representatives of Jordan and the UAR. It also records his view that there is no point in holding a meeting of the Security Council now, and that the position should be reviewed after the Arab summit meeting.

Jordanian Representative

9. UK Mis tel. No. 1999 reports the conversation with El Farra. He is opposed to a Security Council meeting because of the Israel-Jordan-US line up to which it might lead, and to the disarray in which it would show the Arabs. He advised waiting until after the Arab meeting, and asked us to pass the record of the conversation to Amman since his own communications are not good.

/UAR Representative

UAR Representative

10. Zayyat agreed with El Farra (UK His tel. No. 2000) and said that the question was one for the Arabs themselves. He did not however exclude using the consensus procedure in the Security Council.

French Statement

11. The Presidency of the Republic issued a statement on the afternoon of 21 September, deploring the bloody conflict, and affirming that outside intervention from any quarter creates dangers to world peace. Inspired guidance to the press indicated that this is directed both at the Syrians and at any American military intervention.

UAR Chargé

12. The UAR Chargé d'Affaires called on Sir Philip Adams yesterday, ostensibly to make his acquaintance. He left a copy of a UAR statement about rumours of US troop movements and spoke at length about the apprehensions of his government following these rumours. He remarked that it was being said in the diplomatic community that HMG were actively opposing US plans for intervention in Jordan, and that the Prime Minister would say this very firmly to Mr. Nixon.

Arab Summit Meeting

13. The meeting was at first postponed until later (Jedda tel. No. 559) but radio reports now indicate that it is postponed sine die. According to radio reports a high ranking Arab delegation is now in Amman.

14. Cairo tel No. 1049 assesses the aims of the UAR in the context of this meeting. They are: to prevent outside

/intervention

intervention in Jordan; to ensure the survival of King Hussein, since he is the UAR's only possible partner in the quest for a political settlement; to preserve the UAR's relationship with the Palestine resistance; and to prevent the spread of Ba'athism.

15. Sir R. Beaumont considers that the summit is probably unwelcome to Nasser since it will restrict his freedom of action. He also thinks that any Israeli intervention to help Hussein indirectly is likely to destroy his respectability in Arab eyes.

Prime Minister's Message

16. After two drafting amendments, the Prime Minister's message (see para. 14 of yesterday's sitrep) was delivered to Sir R. Beaumont at 1430Z yesterday (Cairo tel No. 1052). The text is as in FCO tel. no. 1216 to UKMis as amended slightly by Cairo tel. no. 1047.

4-Power Appeal

17. Sir Colin Crowe was instructed to discuss such an appeal with his American colleague (FCO tel. no. 1222 to UKMis), after prior discussion with the French. H.M. Ambassadors in Washington and Paris were similarly instructed. The appeal should inter alia condemn foreign intervention in Jordan, urge an end to the strife, call for international medical assistance and seek the early and safe return of the hostages. We have let it be known unattributably that we are working for such an appeal.

18. The French indicated their support (Paris tel. no. 870); this has been confirmed by M. Schumann's letter to the Secretary of State (UKMis tel. no. 2014). Sir Colin Crowe reports however (UKMis tel. no. 2008) that Soviet and US reluctance have brought things to an impasse. The Soviets wished to await the result of the Arab summit, and, although without instructions on the question of a Security Council Meeting or a Four Power

/declaration,

declaration, saw no prospect of agreement on any proposal which did not demand the withdrawal of all foreign troops in Jordan, including those on the West Bank. The Americans are opposed to any general appeal, and they doubt if the Russians would buy one aimed at Syria alone.

19. The Secretary of State has observed (UK Mis tel. No. 2001) that he agrees with Sir C. Crowe's analysis that we should reconsider how far it is in our interest to continue to press for action. The Secretary of State will telegraph^{again}/after he has seen Mr. Rogers today.

III : Reactions outside Jordan

UAR

20. Cairo tel. No. 1045 reports an increasingly anti-Hussein press line. An allegation of Jordanian/Iraqi collusion against the Palestinians represents a significant swing in UAR policy against Hussein. Sir R. Beaumont comments that Hussein would have found few friends at the Arab summit.

21. The single press reference to the UK was disparaging.

Iraq

22. Baghdad tel. No. 650 reports that the Iraqis claim to be still working for the release of the hostages, and suggests that a suitable message at some stage might bear fruit. Baghdad tel. No. 651 reports that the Iraqis are likely to remain on the fence, but that they have made gestures towards the Fedayeen.

Sudan

23. Khartoum tel No. 537 reports that the Sudanese are also officially refraining from taking sides, while sympathising with the guerillas.

/USSR

SECRET

USSR

24. Moscow tel. No. 1092 reports a strong attack in Izvestia on the current US role in the Middle East. Other items merely re-echo previous statements.

IV : H.M. Embassy, Amman

25. H.M. Ambassador was able to take a few hours off when his Counsellor, Head of Chancery and Defence Attaché reached the Embassy yesterday. There is intermittent telephonic contact between the Embassy and their American colleagues. The American fuel situation is now satisfactory.

26. The Embassy report being almost out of beer. Efforts are being made to put this right.

V : Aircraft

TMA DC6, Beirut/Amman/Nicosia, 23 September

27. The prospects for sending the DC6 to Amman today are not good. The intention is to send a chartered Trans-Mediterranean Airways (TMA) DC6 freight aircraft from Beirut to Amman later today with the relief CEO, generator spares, beer and rations for the Embassy, 2½ tons of medical drugs and an RASC medical liaison officer. The remaining cargo space on this leg has been offered to the ICRC. It is planned that at Amman the DC6 will pick up women and children and take them to Nicosia.

28. TMA have stated their additional terms for carrying evacuees to Nicosia (Beirut tel. Nos. 485 and 486). Beirut have been authorised to agree subject to local legal advice to the form of indemnity against claims from passengers which TMA have requested (FCO tel. No. 409).

/ICRC

28. ICRC Beirut have advised that clearance should be obtained from Al Fatah. Hijazi, a Fatah representative, has said that the situation in Amman is likely to be serious on 23 September and cannot give clearance. TMA are unlikely to be willing to fly against Fatah and ICRC recommendations. Beirut Embassy will discuss with TMA early today (Beirut tel. no. 488). The ICRC will try again for Fatah clearance as soon as conditions in Amman seem more favourable (Beirut tel. no. 490).

29. King Hussein will open Amman airport for medical supplies to be flown in and for departing foreigners to be flown out (Amman tel. no. 638). Amman will report on the state of security at Amman airport in the 0730 telex conference.

30. Amman asked that the TMA plane should arrive at Amman airport not later than 1000 hours. Beirut tel. no. 487 says that clearance has been requested for take-off from Beirut at 1300 to avoid clashing with ICRC flights already cleared. The TMA plane does not arrive at Beirut until 0830 and must then be loaded (Beirut tel. no. 489).

RAF Argosy, Cyprus/Beirut, 23 September

31. An RAF Argosy is to fly the 2½ tons of drugs and the RALC liaison officer to Beirut to link with the TMA flight. It was due to arrive at 0830, but Beirut have asked that it should remain at Almotiri until they call it forward (Beirut tel. no. 487).

RAF Argosy, Cyprus/Beirut, 23 September

32. Beirut have been instructed to arrange for one Middle East Airlines Caravelle or Convair to standby from 24 September

/onwards,

onwards, and to obtain an option on a second trip the same or following day. This would be for a general evacuation of British subjects.

33. The spare cargo space on these aircraft from Beirut to Amman would be available either for ICRC supplies or British medical equipment at present pre-positioned in Akrotiri.

ICRC Flights

34. ICRC have two flights going into Amman today but have said they may not be used for the evacuation of foreigners. Any places must be given to the wounded (C.G. Geneva tel. no. 55).

VI : Evacuation

HMG's Plans

35. The Interdepartmental Ministerial Committee decided that the ICRC should be informed that HMG would like a general evacuation of British subjects set in hand under ICRC auspices as soon as possible.

36. Arrangements have been put in hand to have the necessary aircraft standing by in Beirut on 24 September (see Section V).

37. The TMA DC6 flying to Amman today will be used to bring out 20 women and children. TMA will not take more passengers than they can fit seats for (Beirut tel. no. 489). Mr. Phillips will do his best to see that journalists do not jump the queue.

38. The contingency plan for evacuation through Aqaba is being kept up, in case evacuation by air from Amman falls through.

US Plans

39. The Americans now intend to proceed with the evacuation of those US nationals who wish to leave. They are considering

/evacuation

evacuation by air from Amman, evacuation via Aqaba and, in the worst case, the provision of military protection for evacuation (Washington tel. no. 2800). General Vogt has briefed Mr. Freeman on the present state of American contingency planning (Washington tel. no. 271).

VII : Medical Relief

ICRC

40. The ICRC have no clear picture of the situation in Jordan. Boisard spent only a few hours in Amman on 21 September. He reported that medical needs were immense, but there was no means of getting supplies in. The ICRC building in Amman had been destroyed as well as their radio. ICRC medical staff in Amman had no knowledge of events away from the airfield.

41. The ICRC will seek to obtain the agreement of the Jordanians and the Red Cross to the ICRC's assuming responsibility for relief operations on safe conduct guarantees for vehicles and personnel.

42. H.M. Consul General Geneva expects the ICRC to stave off the use of military personnel as long as they can. He sees little likelihood of the loaded aircraft in Akrotiri being required in the immediate future or even for several days (C.G. Geneva tel. no. 53).

British Contribution

43. Use will be made of projected aircraft flights into Amman to fly in medical supplies (see Section V).

44. Colonel Ferrie, RASC has been appointed medical liaison

/officer

officer to the Jordanian armed forces. Sqn. Ldr. Madden has been attached to Beirut Embassy to act as liaison officer with local ICRC representatives.

45. The US Red Cross have issued cards marked "seconded to the ICRC" to American servicemen likely to take part in relief operations. The Director-General of the British Red Cross is doubtful whether his Society can issue papers to British servicemen, but he is prepared to co-operate in the last resort.

46. ICRC have asked for further details of stores, personnel and vehicles available in Akrotiri (C.G. Geneva tel. no. 54).

VIII : Hostages - Berne Group

Hostages

47. There is no news of the whereabouts or fate of the hostages.

Berne Group

48. Boissier remained in Beirut after all. The Berne Group met on the evening of 22 September to consider new PFLP terms (reported in Berne tel. no. 304). The PFLP said that acceptance of the principle of exchange by the Four would bring about the release of the European and Americans who are not dual nationals. Israelis and Americans would be held in a secure place (a hotel in Beirut, according to Boissier) pending further negotiations.

49. The Secretary of State thought these terms a significant advance (UNHIS New York tel. no. 2003). Berne Embassy were instructed to urge that the Group's reply should indicate positive interest in a bargain and seek more precise information about the numbers of British, Swiss, Germans and Americans to be released.

/50. At the

50. At the Group's meeting, the American said that his instructions forbade consideration of any deal involving discrimination and that the precise statement of numbers we required implied readiness to accept a discriminatory solution.

51. The Group decided to ask Boissier to extract a precise statement of the proposal including a list giving names and nationalities of all the hostages the PFLP hold. Boissier should suggest that all hostages should be taken without delay to a place of safety (Berne tel. nos. 307 and 308).

IX : Miss Khaled

52. Sir Dingle Foot approached the Home Secretary about a request he had received from a Lebanese advocate claiming to act for Miss Khaled's parents, asking for a private meeting with Miss Khaled. The Home Secretary is likely to reply that under British law, there is no provision for access to someone in Miss Khaled's circumstances. She has not in any case asked to see a solicitor. The Home Secretary is not inclined to use the argument of reciprocity.

Middle East Crisis

RECEIVED IN
REGISTRY No. 10
- 2 OCT 1970

SITREP at 0700 hours on 24 September, 1970

(all times referred to are BST
unless otherwise stated)

NES 1/10

I : The Military SituationAmman

Amman remained quiet throughout 23 September and a number of aircraft were able to fly in and out. There have been radio reports of isolated shelling, and Israeli sources reported (FOH 231030Z) that the Army was still shelling isolated pockets of resistance.

North Jordan

2. The same Israeli sources report Syrian losses in the North, and that after taking heavy punishment from the Jordanians, some Syrian units are being withdrawn. Radio reports also say this. The Israelis assert that the Syrian withdrawal was due to Arab and Soviet pressure, and to the fear of Israeli and US intervention. Further checking has revealed that the amount of armour on both sides is lower than originally estimated.

3. Iraqi forces are reported as remaining in Jordan without taking any action. Baghdad tel. no. 654 confirms this.

Israeli Movements

4. Tel Aviv tel. no. 896 reports that the build up of Israeli forces in the north-east of the country continues and is now at the level of four brigades or equivalent. Tel Aviv tel. no. 897 reports on an Israeli cabinet meeting at which, it is understood, no firm decision was taken. The balance of opinion in the cabinet, including that of General Dayan, is thought to be against Israeli intervention.

II : Diplomatic ActivityAnglo-French Statement

5. Paris tel. no. 881 reports the French reaction to the Secretary of State's idea of a joint statement. The French official view is broadly favourable, with the reservation that such an appeal might imply the collapse of the four power machinery. However, they broadly concur with the proposed text (FCO tel. no. 1222 to UKMis New York, para 3).

M. Schumann's views will now be sought.

New York

6. Sir Colin Crowe has reported (UKMis tel. no. 2022) that he was asked to call on the President of the Security Council yesterday. The President told him that he had seen Malik (USSR) who had said that he doubted the appropriateness of a Four Power meeting, but that if any statement were to issue from one, it would have to include a reference to Israeli withdrawal. Sir C. Crowe briefed the President on his own consultations; he believes that the President's ^{aim is} merely to brief himself, and to ensure that the Security Council is not overlooked.

7. New York's press line is contained in UKMis tel. no. 2023.

Arab Summit

8. Cairo tel. no. 1054 reports a degree of confusion surrounding the summit. The outcome of a series of meetings, from which several delegations were absent, was the despatch to Amman of a mission consisting of President Numeiri, the Tunisian Prime Minister, the Kuwaiti Minister of Defence, and General Sadiq. The mission, which is reported on the radio as having already visited Amman, is charged with stopping the fighting, limiting the crisis so as to prevent foreign intervention and finally with finding a modus vivendi for Jordan in the future. Sir R. Beaumont suggests that the Palestinian reaction has been such as to make slight its chances of success.

NATO

9. UKDel Nato tel. no. 506 reports that Nato is to discuss the situation at this morning's Council meeting. Background for a UK statement has been sent (FCO tel. no. 327 to UKDel).

USA

10. The Secretary of State spoke yesterday with the President and Mr. Rogers. Washington tel. nos. 2820 to 2822 report his subsequent remarks to the press.

III: Reactions outside Jordan

UAR.

11. Cairo continue to report (tel. no. 1054) a pro-Palestinian line in the UAR press although the PLO's most extreme remarks do not appear to have been quoted.

Iraq

12. Baghdad report (tel. no. 654) indications that the Iraqis believe that the days of the Jordanian monarchy are numbered. There are also press reports of volunteers being sent to Jordan, although no large-scale movements have been seen, and of a recall from leave of members of the Salahuddin forces. There appears to be a limited state of alert in Baghdad.

China

13. Peking report a government statement (tel. no. 613) reiterating Chinese support for the guerillas and against a political settlement. Mr. Denson's analysis is that the Chinese have no wish to get directly entangled in the Middle East, and while they are likely to continue to supply revolutionary movements, such support will be covert. The Swiss Chargé is also reported as pursuing his quest for Chinese intervention on behalf of the hijacked (tel. no. 614). Mr. Denson thinks that the Chinese are opposed to hijacking, but whether they have made this view known is not clear.

/USSR

USSR.

14. Moscow report (tel. no. 1096) that the Soviet press continues to report the events in Jordan without mention of alleged Syrian involvement. US preparations for a rescue operation are said to be no more than a cover for military intervention. Telegram no. 1097 reports an article strongly condemning hijacking in general and the activities of the PFLP in particular.

IV : H.M. Embassy, Amman

15. The relief CBO and the spares for the generator have arrived. Supplies of food are adequate for the time being.

V : Evacuation

General

16. The TMA DC6 to Amman on 23 September brought out 21 British and 9 UN women and children. Two of the UN group were British. Today it is hoped to evacuate a further 35 British and 36 UN, of whom 20 are British or Commonwealth. After today it is expected that those left will be

- (a) those the Embassy cannot reach (roughly 42 of whom 17 are in Amman and the others elsewhere in Jordan, including 14 at Aqaba, where they are in no danger);
- (b) those the Embassy cannot spare; and
- (c) those who consider it their duty to stay and who could only be removed by force (so far about 19).

17. Plans to send a second aircraft to Amman yesterday were dropped, as it would have been difficult to persuade the Jordanians to lay on a second convoy to fill the aircraft before darkness.

18. An ICRC aircraft which took medical supplies to Amman brought out able-bodied journalists as well as some women and children.

/Plans

Plans for Evacuation, 24 September

19. According to information reaching airlines the runway at Amman airport is at times limited to 4,000 feet because of firing at the southern end. The aircraft to be used today will depend on answers about the state of the runway, which Beirut Embassy have asked for by 0700 (tel. no. 496). (As at 0705 Amman have reported that the runway is clear, and a message has been passed to Beirut accordingly).

20. A Middle East Airlines Caravelle has been hired to be available at Amman at 1000 hours, subject to confirmation that the full length of the runway will be available.

21. By way of backstop and in case additional capacity is required two DC3 aircraft of ADCO have been chartered. One of these can be at Amman at 1000 hours and could make one flight to Beirut and a second to Nicosia. The other DC3 would be available at Amman during the afternoon and would make one flight to Nicosia. This aircraft is in Cyprus and its servicability is being checked.

22. If the full length of Amman runway is not available and all 70 are to be evacuated, the first DC3 must leave Beirut not later than 0730 (Beirut tel. no. 496).

23. RAF aircraft are being positioned to lift 100 evacuees from Nicosia to Gatwick (i.e. 30 at present in Nicosia and 70 to be brought out today) and, if necessary, to take 35 of today's evacuees from Beirut to Nicosia (MODUK Air 232128Z).

24. MCD have not been offering journalists any hope of free lifts on RAF aircraft (MODUK 221850Z to HQBFNE).

25. The US Embassy in Jeddah are being asked if there would be space on any Saudi aircraft they may charter to bring Americans out through Aqaba to pick up the 14-17 British already there.

/Aqaba

Aqaba Route

26. The Israeli press surmised from our enquiries about accommodation in Eilat that we were making contingency plans for evacuation via Aqaba/Eilat.

27. It was established that it should be technically possible for a Hercules to land at Eilat, but a fully laden aircraft of this type might have difficulty. The Israelis agreed in principle to such flights. Tel Aviv Embassy suggest that it might be safer, easier and more comfortable to send the evacuees by air-conditioned coach to Lod.

ICRC

28. ICRC have said informally they do not see how they could agree that evacuation arrangements should be under their auspices. For aircraft to operate under ICRC colours, clearance would be necessary from both parties to the conflict and there would be difficulty in increasing the number of ICRC aircraft operating into Amman. The ICRC do not want to take up our offer of spare space on our MEA aircraft (C.G. Geneva tel. no. 56).

29. Amman Embassy will be in touch with the local ICRC representative, who has reappeared, but they do not think he will be of much help over evacuation.

US Plans

30. The American Ambassador in Amman has told Mr. Phillips that he has decided to evacuate all inessential members of his staff and to advise the American community to leave as soon as possible. (0945 telex).

31. From an evacuation notice broadcast last night by VOA (and once by the BBC, at the Americans' request) it appears that the Chinese, Germans, Dutch and Italians are invited to participate in the American evacuation beginning today.

/VI

VI : Medical Relief

Amman

32. Medical supplies were aboard the ICRC aircraft and the TMA DC6 which arrived in Amman yesterday.

ICRC

33. ICRC Geneva informed a MOD delegation, who called with ^{of} details/material and personnel in Akrotiri, that the ICRC were concentrating on help offered by Arab governments. The Palestinians were objecting to help from certain governments, particularly the British and US governments. There seems little likelihood of their accepting our offer until the conflicting parties agree to it. An ICRC delegation was due to leave yesterday for Amman. (C.G. Geneva tel. no. 57).

Save the Children Fund

34. SCF supplied 10 tons of blankets and medical supplies to the Jordanian Embassy for despatch yesterday by air to Amman or Aqaba (FCO tel. no. 377 to Amman).

Israel

35. The Israeli Minister of Health announced his country's readiness to treat Jordanian war casualties in Israeli hospitals (Tel Aviv tel. no. 898).

Abu Dhabi

36. The Director of the Abu Dhabi Palace Office has apparently agreed, under PFLP pressure, to provide a surgical team and medical supplies, together with financial aid. Subject to the Ruler's confirmation, it is the intention to fly the team and supplies direct to Amman (Abu Dhabi tel. no. 245).

VII : Hostages - Berne Group

Hostages

37. While there is no hard news on the whereabouts of the

/hostages,

hostages, it has been indicated to sources in Beirut that the PFLP may have transferred the hostages to the Iraq Army HQ outside Amman.

Berne Group

38. Mr. Midgley has reported (Berne tel. no. 310) that M. Boissier has been unsuccessful in persuading his contact with the PFLP to negotiate on the basis of the letter in Berne tel. no. 308. He also reported that the PFLP were threatening to announce their ~~terms~~ to the press in such a way as to put the blame for the delay in reaching agreement solely on the four governments concerned.

39. As a compromise, Boissier proposed a form of words (text in tel. under reference) based on the PFLP's first proposal (Berne tel. no. 304). Mr. Midgley recommended a further proposal (Berne tel. no. 311) which would tell the PFLP the number of each nationality which we understood them to hold. He was instructed (FCO tel. no. 189 to Berne) to propose a Four-Power message on this basis. At the same time Washington were asked to discuss developments with the Americans, in particular the news that some more of the Americans may hold Israeli passports.

40. The Group was unable to agree to a letter on the lines of Mr. Midgley's instructions, but finally the Four were able to agree ad referendum a letter to Boissier, (Berne tel. no. 313), subject to a confidential guidance (Berne tel. no. 314). Mr. Midgley makes it clear however that, if the letter is not agreed, the Swiss and Germans are likely to strike their own bargains.

Secretary of State's Discussions

41. We await a report (see Washington tel. no. 2817) on the Secretary of State's discussions with Mr. Rogers on the Berne

/Group

Group proposals.

VIII : Leila Khaled

42. The Home Office and other Departments concerned are to be informed if we hear from Berne or Amman that any Arabs have left for this country for the purpose of having access to Miss Khaled.

IX : ICAO

43. Western European ICAO Council members plus Canada met informally in Paris at the invitation of the Americans to hear an explanation of the US draft resolution for the ICAO Council on aircraft hijacking. No collective conclusions were reached (Paris tel. nos. 872 and 873).

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21

Middle East Crisis

START at 0700 hours on 25 September, 1970

(all times referred to are BST
unless otherwise stated)

RECEIVED IN REGISTRY No. 10 - 2 OCT 1970
NET 1/10

I : The Military Situation

Amman

Amman was fairly quiet throughout 24 September. Army units using tanks continued to flush out snipers, who are still active in several areas including the Embassy quarter. Aircraft were able to fly in and out.

2. The ICRC have called for a 24-hour cease fire in order to evacuate the wounded. There has so far been no response.

North Jordan

3. Israeli sources (ICN 241245Z) reported that Irbid had been retaken by the Jordanian army which was mopping up in the town. The Syrian army was said to have taken up position behind its own frontier.

II : Diplomatic Activity

New York

4. The Secretary of State and Mr. Rogers discussed the question of a Four-Power Declaration calling upon all states to refrain from intervention in Jordan (UKMis telnos. 2037-2039). Mr. Rogers commented that any statement acceptable to the Soviet Union would have to be "pretty mealy mouthed". In the light of reports of the withdrawal of Syrian forces, the Secretary of State and Mr. Rogers agreed to drop the idea of a declaration unless the situation changed.

/The Secretary

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5. The Secretary of State addressed the UN General Assembly (text awaited).

Meeting of Arab Leaders

6. Cairo telno. 1059 reports the return of President Numeiri and his delegation after their peace mission to Jordan. The Delegation is alleged to have recommended an immediate cease fire, talks with PLO leaders, a change of government in Jordan and the withdrawal of armed forces from Amman.

7. According to Reuter, a second peace mission led by the Sudanese Prime Minister flew into Amman in the hope of beginning talks with Arafat. STOP PRESS. Arafat will meet mission (BBC 0800).

8. A committee has been formed under King Faisal to co-ordinate Arab relief operations in Jordan.

9. Brigadier Dawood, the Jordanian Prime Minister, who has been attending the Cairo talks, is said to have disappeared from his room having left a note tendering his resignation, which (according to radio reports) King Hussein has accepted.

Jordan

10. King Hussein sent personal messages of gratitude to the Prime Minister (telex conference 1830Z) and to President Nixon (Amman telno. 645).

NATO

11. A report is awaited on yesterday's Council meeting which discussed the crisis in Jordan.

Iran

12. H.M. Ambassador in Tehran was informed (telno. 632) that, on instructions from the Shah proposals had been put to the

/"neighbouring

"neighbouring Moslem countries" of the UK, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya and Turkey to seek to arrange for a cease fire in Jordan. There had so far been no response to this initiative.

III : Reactions outside Jordan

Tunisia

13. There have been local press reports that Moscow and Belgrade have congratulated Tunisia for her initiative in proposing Arab summit meetings in Cairo to stop the fighting in Jordan (telno. 284).

IV : H.M. Embassy Amman

14. Supplies are adequate for the moment. Mr. Phillips is considering whether his staff can be further reduced.

V : Evacuation

General

15. Two further evacuation flights from Amman to Nicosia arranged by H.M.G. were successfully carried out on 24 September. An MDA Caravelle brought out 77 people (48 British, 20 UN, 6 German, 2 Belgian and 1 Spanish) and an ADCO DC3 brought out a further 20 (16 UN and 4 British).

16. The first batch of evacuees to arrive in the UK (totalling 54, of whom 47 were British) landed at Gatwick at 2300 hours in an RAF Britannia. They were met by Mr. Royle and an FCC contingent. Hotel accommodation in London and transport facilities had been arranged for those who required it.

17. H.M. Ambassador in Amman classified those British subjects still in Jordan as:-

- (a) 24 Embassy staff including dependents;
- (b) 21 who have refused evacuation;

/ (c)

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(c) 26 who are outside Amman and cannot be reached.

(d) 11 who cannot be reached within Amman.

18. Embassy staff will try today to get in touch with the latter, who include the two journalists believed to be in the Philadelphia Hotel. (1830Z telex).

19. 24 journalists attempted to board the IEA Caravelle when it left Beirut, but were prevented from doing so (Beirut telno. 500).

20. The ICRC refused an offer of cargo space on this flight but their acceptance of space on the previous day's TMA DC6 indicates that the refusal was made on practical grounds rather than on principle (Beirut telno. 505).

Aqaba Route

21. The possibility was explored of chartering a Saudi Arabian Airlines DC3 to pick up evacuees from Aqaba. The Saudi authorities ruled however that the situation was still too dangerous for them to allow one of their aircraft to fly into Jordan. (Jedda tels. 562, 566 and 569).

ICRC

22. The ICRC now seem prepared to carry out some evacuation. The Consulate General in Geneva telephoned at 1950 with a message that any remaining British subjects who wished to be evacuated on ICRC aircraft should contact the ICRC delegation at the Muhacher Hospital in Amman. The ICRC are also expecting a request for evacuation from the Greek community in Amman (Athens telnos. 2 and 3 to Amman).

US Plans

23. The US government are planning a further evacuation operation today by civilian chartered aircraft. According to

/the text

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the text of the message which the US Embassy in London asked the BBC Overseas Service to transmit during the course of the night 24/25 September, the aircraft would be at the disposal also of nationals of China, Germany, the Netherlands and Italy.

VI : Relief

The Situation in Amman

24. Colonel Ferrie, the RALC Liaison Officer in Amman, reports that there seems to be still no central medical control in Amman and it is impossible to estimate casualties accurately.

Collection of casualties is impeded by the fighting. Once a cease fire is announced the task of collecting casualties will be enormous. Medical supplies are badly needed (241240Z).

25. King Hussein has issued an urgent appeal for food supplies, tents and blankets to the British, French and US governments. (teleprinter conference 1830Z).

ICRC

26. The ICRC advised the MOD medical aid mission to Geneva on 23 September that British and US personnel would not be acceptable under the ICRC umbrella. The ICRC issued on 24 September an urgent appeal to national Red Cross societies for medical assistance in the form of cash or medical supplies, and asked specifically that medical personnel should not yet be sent to Jordan until coordination arrangements are complete (^{GENEVA}~~Amman~~ telno. 53). Medical teams from Kuwait and Switzerland are, however, already in Jordan or on the way, and teams are ready in Tunisia and Egypt.

UK Aid

27. In view of the ICRC's attitude it has been decided to

/concentrate

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concentrate on the provision of foodstuff and medical supplies which will be offered direct to the Jordanian Red Crescent. The supplies, if acceptable to the Red Crescent, will be flown out in civilian aircraft (FCO telno. 389 to Amman).

28. The idea is also under consideration to set up the field based hospital at Dekalia in Cyprus instead of transporting it to Jordan. Casualties would then be flown out from Jordan for treatment in Cyprus. H.M. Ambassador Amman will put this suggestion presently to King Hussein and Colonel Ferrie (teleprinter conference 1830Z).

Abu Dhabi

29. An aircraft carrying a surgical team and medical supplies supplied for Jordan by the Ruler was to have left Abu Dhabi on 24 September but has been delayed a further 24 hours. (Kuwait telno. 22 to Abu Dhabi).

French Aid

30. The French government is prepared to offer both supplies and surgical personnel, the latter under the auspices of the French Ministry of Defence (Paris telno. 884).

UN

31. U Thant has issued an appeal to all nations to contribute to the relief effort for Jordan.

VII : Hostages

32. There is still no hard news about their whereabouts.

Secretary of State's talk with Mr. Rogers (UKMis telno. 2040)

33. The Secretary of State said that public opinion in Britain would fail to understand why there had been no settlement of the

/PFLP

PFLP latest terms according to which all but three of the hostages - the dual nationals - would be released. If, however, it was a question of 19 American citizens remaining as hostages, the position was different. Mr. Rogers replied that even the present offer, not confirmed, was discriminatory. American public opinion recognised the dangers of giving in to blackmail. He did, however, think that the Israelis might be prevailed upon to release some guerillas in exchange for the dual nationals. In conversation with the Secretary of State Mr. Eban subsequently confirmed that his government would probably be prepared to release the two Algerians and the 10 Lebanese (UKMIs New York telno. 2048).

Berne Group

34. Ministers decided that the draft letter to M. Boissier (Berne telno. 313) and the confidential guidance which had been agreed ad referendum on 23 September were not acceptable. FCO telno. 190 instructed Mr. Midgley to urge that the reply to PFLP:

- (i) should require that the hostages be brought to a safe place and access granted;
- (ii) should ask for the names and nationalities of the hostages;
- (iii) should confirm that the assurances given by the Arab governments about the release of the Fedayeen still stood.

35. However, if the Americans (recognising that not 2 or 3 but up to 37 American hostages might be retained), could accept the proposed terms of exchanges, H.M. Ambassador could also give his assent.

36. Berne telnos. 320-322 report the outcome of the Group's meeting last night at which representatives of the four governments

/reached

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reached agreement on the text of a letter to be sent to M. Boissier. This incorporated points (i) and (iii) above but not (ii) which should, however, be satisfied if full access were granted and on which M. Boissier is given advice. In the confidential guidance to M. Boissier it is stated that "a global solution" remains the fundamental objective. Thus the common front remains in being.

38. M. Boissier has informed the Group (Berne telno. 323) that his usual PFIP contact has advised him that the hostages were in good physical condition and were able to listen to BBC broadcasts.

VIII: Leila Khaled

39. The ICRC were told in reply to an urgent request for one of their staff to visit Miss Khaled that this could be granted only on a reciprocal basis. According to the ICRC the French and German governments had unconditionally agreed that the ICRC could have access to Fedayeen detainees (telno. 58).

(22)

MIDDLE EAST CRISISAmman at 0700 hours on 26 September 1970(all times referred to are BST
unless otherwise stated)

RECEIVED IN REGISTRY No. 10 - 1 OCT 1970
NEJ 1/10

I: The Military SituationAmman

Although the city has been quiet by night, Army tanks have by day continued their efforts to eliminate snipers and pockets of resistance.

General Situation

2. A broadcast on behalf of the King and Arafat calling for a cease-fire was made around mid-day, but the order is not being strictly observed by either side. Apart from the Irbid area, the country is under the control of the army (I.D.F. report and Amman tel. no. 651).

North Jordan

3. I.D.F. Tel Aviv (FOH 251115Z) says that despite reports to the contrary, Irbid has not yet been secured by the Jordanian Army. Thursday's attack on the town was halted, it is believed, by a "political brake" exercised by King Hussein in response to a cease-fire appeal from Cairo. Israeli sources expected that the town, which was surrounded by the army, would have been taken yesterday, but there has been no hard news of recent developments.

Israel

4. Israeli forces still seem to be in their concentration areas (tel no. 906) and there is yet no sign of a move back or of the demobilisation of reservists.

Libya

5. Various unconfirmed reports have been received of a
battalion/

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battalion of Libyan troops having been flown to Syria during the last few days (Tripoli tel no. 1363).

Iraq

6. Baghdad tel 251111Z summarizes probable Iraqi troop movements during the past week.

II: Diplomatic Activity

7. The delegation of Arab leaders led by President Numeiri had talks with Arafat and King Hussein culminating in a broadcast appeal at mid-day Friday for a cease-fire. Upon his return to Cairo, accompanied by Arafat, Numeiri is alleged to have accused Hussein of ignoring the truce.

8. A second delegation consisting of three leading Palestinians was despatched to Damascus. Meanwhile talks continued in Cairo among the remaining Heads of State (tel no. 1061).

Libya

9. Libya is reported to have broken off all relations with Jordan (BEC 0600 hours) and to have given asylum to Brigadier Daoud, the former Jordanian Prime Minister.

III: Reactions outside Jordan

U.A.R.

10. IDF Tel Aviv (FCH 251112) note the changing tone of Egyptian propaganda. They say that Hussein is being blamed for the carnage but that the extremists of the PFLP must also share the blame for their irresponsible acts. The fear of foreign intervention particularly by the U.S. and/or Israel is repeatedly mentioned by Cairo.

Soviet Union

11. Pravda stresses the "profound interest" of the Soviet Union

in the/

in the speedy termination of the "fratricidal war" in Jordan and calls on all states to demonstrate circumspection in their actions.

IV: H.M. Embassy Amman

12. Essential supplies are being flown in by planes taking out evacuees. The Ambassador thinks he may be able to reduce his staff by four when the situation improves.

V: Evacuation

British Subjects

13. The number of British subjects remaining in Jordan (excluding journalists) was estimated by H.M. Embassy in the telex conference at 0900 Z to be 82, falling into the following categories:-

- (a) 24 British Embassy;
- (b) 21 in Amman who have been contacted and refuse to leave;
- (c) 9 inaccessible who would probably wish to be evacuated;
- (d) 13 not contacted who are unlikely to wish to be evacuated;
- (e) 15 in Aqaba.

H.M. Embassy Beirut subsequently reported (Beirut tel no. 517) that six British subjects, including three journalists, arrived in Beirut from Amman on 25 September by MEA chartered flight.

14. It is hoped to evacuate the British subjects in Aqaba today by means of a DC3 flight Beirut/Amman/Aqaba/Beirut. The Embassy Air Attaché is expected to join the flight at Amman (FCC tel. no. 399 to Amman). The BBC have broadcast messages to British subjects in Aqaba asking them to prepare for evacuation. (FCC tel no. 395 to Amman).

15. H.M. Ambassador/

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15. Ambassador thinks that the few remaining evacuees will be able to leave by Red Cross aircraft and that there is no need for further flights to be chartered by H.M.G. (telex conference at 1600Z).

VI: Relief

ICRC

16. Geneva tel. no 60 reports that offers of medical aid are flooding in from all directions in response to the ICRC appeal. More ICRC representatives have arrived in Amman where they are discussing with the Jordanian authorities the acceptability of U.S. and U.K. offers of medical assistance. The ICRC are sensible of the hostility of the more extreme guerrillas towards such assistance, but Colonel Ferrie, the RAMC Liaison Officer in Amman, believes that the ICRC men on the spot would personally welcome the arrival of the British Field Hospital (Amman tel. no 251500Z to HQBFNE).

17. The ICRC representatives in Amman have already arranged authority for three French aircraft to fly to Amman on 26 September with about 50 medical military personnel and some light vehicles (Geneva tel. no 60). A civilian surgical team is also believed to be standing by in Beirut (Geneva tel. no 61).

U.K. Aid

18. As the Jordanian Red Crescent is virtually non-existent, the only organisations capable of receiving medical supplies offered by H.M.G. would be the Jordanian army or the ICRC (telex conference 1600Z). It has been decided to send the supplies by charter aircraft on Sunday 27 September to arrive the following day for

delivery/

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for delivery to the ICRC (FCO tel. no 398 to Amman).

19. Colonel Perrie reports from Amman that the Jordanian Minister of Health welcomes the MOD casualty evacuation plan and would also like to receive the 50-bed field hospital as soon as possible. The Minister is taking the matter up with the ICRC representatives.

(Amman tel. no 25100Z)

20. Meanwhile the MOD are going ahead with the plans to charter a civil aircraft which will stand by in Cyprus until Colonel Perrie reports that satisfactory arrangements can be made in Amman for assembling the wounded. A MOD team would accompany each flight and there would be no detachment based in Amman.

VII: Hostages

21. All 8 of the British hostages, together with 5 Germans and 2 Swiss, were found unharmed by the Jordanian army at 0930 on 25 September in a hut in Jebel Mussein. H.M. Consul was able to visit the freed hostages for an hour later in the day. They were in good health and said that they had been well treated by the PFLP (telex conference 1600Z). The Jordanian army subsequently claimed to have discovered a third Swiss hostage (BBC 0500). The remaining 38 hostages have still not been traced.

22. Arrangements are in hand to fly the 16 freed hostages during the course of 26 September to Cyprus by MEA Comet and thence to Heathrow by RAF Britannia. The MEA Comet will carry Embassy stores and a Grade 10 Officer from Beirut to Amman. If, as seems possible, some of the U.S. hostages have been located and freed by the time

the Comet/

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the Comet arrives they too will be flown in it to Cyprus (FCO tel. no 399 to Amman). Because of the risk of further hijacking or reprisal, details of the operation are not being released.

Berne Group

23. The Group meets again at 1000 hours today. Meanwhile the ICRC in Beirut have been instructed to avoid any commitments with the PFLP.

VIII: Leila Khaled

24. Ministers agreed that H.M.G. were prepared to release Miss Khaled to an Arab country as part of a satisfactory settlement which secured the release of all the detained hostages.

25. H.M. Ambassador in Tel Aviv (tel. no 909) commented that news of Miss Khaled being simply handed back to the PFLP would cause indignation in Israel.

IX: Hijacking

26. A message has been sent by the Prime Minister to pilots of all British aircraft warning them to take the strictest precautions against the danger of hijacking in the light of the rescue of the 8 British hostages in Amman and the continued detention of Miss Khaled.

(23)

Middle East Crisis

SITREP at 0700 on 27 September, 1970

RECEIVED IN REGISTRY No. 10 - 2 OCT 1970 NES 1/10
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I : The Military Situation

Amman

H.M. Ambassador reports (Tel. No. 663) that the cease-fire seems to be generally effective, although occasional bursts of gunfire are heard. Amman cannot be said to be under full army control with the city centre and Jebel Amman east of the First Circle still occupied by the Fedayeen.

General Situation

2. There have been no reports of serious fighting elsewhere in Jordan. It is still not known whether the Fedayeen are continuing to hold Irbid and other northern towns.

II : Political Situation and Diplomatic Activity

Jordan

3. Amman radio announced the formation of a new Jordan Government of "reconstruction and unity" with Ahmed Toukan, a Palestinian as Prime Minister and Foreign Minister. Five of its members were in the former military Government. PFLP radio said that its attitude to the new Government was the same as that towards the previous military regime.

Cairo

4. In a strongly worded message to King Hussein published in Al-Ahram, President Nasser expressed deep concern about the situation in Jordan as reported by President Numeiri, leader of the Peace Mission. Nasser alleged that the Jordanian forces were still shooting, all promises had been broken, there was a plan to limit the Palestinian revolution and the terrifying slaughter

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was contrary to all Arab and humanitarian values".

5. At a press conference in Cairo President Numeiri subsequently accused King Hussein of carrying out a criminal conspiracy to liquidate the Palestinian people on behalf of Israel and the United States. King Hussein, issuing a denial on Amman radio, said that the charges harmed the Jordanian people and the army and would aggravate the explosive situation in Jordan. H.M. Ambassador, Cairo has commented that the Arab leaders may hold Hussein personally responsible for the carnage and it will be extremely difficult for his relations with the other Arabs to return to their previous state of a few weeks ago (Cairo tel. No. 1068).

6. According to the Egyptian Ministry of National Guidance, King Hussein will arrive in Cairo today for talks with Arab leaders.

III : Reactions outside Jordan

U.N.

7. In a joint statement the President of the Security Council and the Secretary General registered their profound distress at the bloodshed and suffering in Jordan, hoped that peace efforts would be successful and asked all member governments and U.N. Agencies to provide humanitarian aid (tel. No. 2079).

Moscow

8. Moscow tel. No. 1112 reports that the Russians have attempted to maintain a delicate balance in their relationship with the Jordanian Government and the Palestinians. H.M. Ambassador says that the Soviet Government must be greatly relieved that a situation did not develop where, in response to Israeli intervention, the Russians had to decide whether to come to the aid of Arabs even less reliable than the Egyptians.

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If the Syrian withdrawal was in part the result of Soviet pressure in Damascus and Baghdad, the USSR's difficulties with these Governments may have increased. Soviet/Egyptian relations, however, would appear to have emerged unscathed. The Russians are probably anxious to see the Canal ceasefire maintained, and some kind of substantive talks embarked on under Jarring's auspices.

IV : H.M. Embassy, Amman

9. The staff have been heavily engaged in making arrangements for despatching the European hostages and in organising medical aid supplies.

V : Evacuation

10. There are only three British subjects in Amman whom the Embassy have still been unable to contact (Amman tel. No. 668).

11. Nineteen evacuees, of whom 17 are British, were flown from Aqaba and Amman by D.C.3 to Beirut on 26 September (Beirut tel. No. 522).

12. The French aircraft which flew into Amman with medical supplies and personnel on 26 September were also made available for the evacuation of foreign nationals (Amman tel. No. 670).

The B.B.C. broadcast a message to this effect.

VI : Relief

I.C.R.C.

13. The I.C.R.C. team in Amman are improving co-ordination but they are still short of staff. The I.C.R.C. have agreed that medical assistance is welcome from all sources, including the U.K. and the U.S.A. (Amman tel. No. 662).

U.K. Aid

14. 2½ tons of medical supplies have already been flown into Amman. A civilian freighter on charter to the F.C.O. is scheduled to fly to Amman today with a further 16 tons of medical supplies and it is hoped that another 6 tons of medical supplies will be carried on the aircraft chartered for the evacuation of wounded. The supplies will be consigned to the Co-ordinating Committee of the I.C.R.C. in Amman (Amman tels. Nos. 662 and 664.)

15. The civil aircraft chartered by M.O.D. to carry out casualty evacuation is expected to arrive in Nicosia this morning with 6 tons of supplies. The I.C.R.C. have asked that it remain there on stand-by until the casualty numbers in Jordan have been properly assessed. An I.C.R.C. request via Colonel Ferrie for a field ambulance section and three ambulances is under consideration by the M.O.D. Colonel Ferrie has been asked to advise the I.C.R.C. in Amman and the Jordanian Government that a field hospital, if supplied, would have to be flown in by R.A.F. aircraft (Amman tel. No. 662 and MODUK/Amman 261515Z). Geneva reports that the I.C.R.C. have formally requested that the U.K. supply eight ambulances (without drivers) to the I.C.R.C. in Beirut (Geneva tel. No. 64).

Other Relief Operations

16. In response to King Hussein's appeal, the State Department has instructed the U.S. Embassies in Ankara and Beirut to release emergency food rations. President Nixon has allocated \$5 million for an emergency food programme and a special co-ordinating committee has been set up in Washington.

The Americans have been unable to reconcile their differences with the I.C.R.C. over the supply of medical relief and are proceeding independently of the I.C.R.C. with the agreement of the Jordanian Government (Washington tel. Nos. 2857 and 2861).

17. Turkish military aircraft delivered medical and food supplies to Amman on 25 September (Ankara tel. No. 1506).

VII : Hostages

European Hostages

18. The 16 freed hostages were flown on 26 September to Cyprus by MEA Comet and then by R.A.F. Britannia to London, where they were met by Mr. Royle and representatives from the F.C.O., BOAC, the R.A.F. and the Swiss and German Embassies. The Prime Minister has expressed his gratitude to King Hussein for his efforts in securing the rescue of the hostages (FCO tel. No. 404). The Secretary of State is also sending a personal message to the King (UKMIS tel. No. 2096).

19. The danger of the Cyprus Government making a public issue of the arrival of the MEA Comet (a civil aircraft) at Akrotiri instead of at Nicosia, has been averted. (HQBFNE No. 261355Z, Beirut tel. No. 521 and Nicosia tel. No. 608).

Remaining U.S. and Israeli Hostages

20. The situation is confused. Amman radio reports the release of 32 of the 38 hostages who are being sheltered by the Army, but there have been other reports that all the hostages are safe. H.M. Embassy are trying to establish the true position.

21. H.M. Ambassador, Cairo (tel. No. 1073) reported at 1410 hours that President Nasser had sent a message suggesting that he might be able to secure the release of all the hostages in the British,

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German and Swiss Governments would undertake to release the Fedayeen held by them. F.C.O. tel. No. 2177 to Washington, Bonn and Berne stated that H.M.G. were ready to contribute to the suggested exchange. The German and Swiss Governments gave this agreement, but the State Department, on Mr. Rogers' instructions, asked us not to respond to the Egyptian offer for two hours in the hope that the Jordanian army would recover all the hostages without there being need of an exchange.

22. After telephone consultations with H.M. Ambassador Washington, the Embassy in Cairo were instructed to inform the Egyptians (F.C.O. tel. No. 955) that, while we remained ready to consider an exchange for all the hostages, we had to be clear in this confused situation that we were dealing with those who had control over the hostages and could deliver them. At the same time H.M. Embassies in Berne and Bonn were asked to enquire whether, if it was finally established that the Egyptians retained control over an exchange, the Swiss and German Governments would consent to return the prisoners held by us and then without the specific agreement of the Americans. Replies are awaited from these two Governments and from Cairo.

VIII : Leila Khaled

23. In conversation with H.M. Ambassador, Berne, M. Naville, President of the I.C.R.C., again pressed for H.M.G. to reconsider their decision not to permit an I.C.R.C. representative to visit Miss Khaled (Berne tel. No. 335). The purpose of the visit, he explained, would be to strengthen M. Boissier's position in negotiations with the P.F.L.P.

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24. H.M. Ambassadors in Amman (tel. No. 1296) and Beirut (tel. No. 519) predict a sharp reaction and perhaps reprisals from the P.F.L.P. if Miss Khaled is not released - particularly if all the hostages held by the Fedayeen have been returned - or if Miss Khaled is handed over to the Israelis.

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Middle East crisis

SITREP at 0700 on 28 September 1970

(all times referred to are BST unless
otherwise stated)

RECEIVED IN
LIBRARY No. 10
1 OCT 28
NEJ 1/10

I. The military situation

Amman

Although the cease-fire has been observed generally and the city is fairly quiet, there have been sporadic outbursts of firing as Army tanks and armoured vehicles continue their search for snipers. The city centre and other areas are still held by the Fedayeen. In the Defence Attache's opinion (telno 681) it would take a major operation by many more troops, particularly infantry, than are available to clear Amman.

North Jordan

2. Irbid and the northern towns are still in Fedayeen hands with the Army waiting outside (Tel Aviv FOH 271000Z). There have been isolated incidents and sniping in the area. The south of Jordan is said to be under the control of the Army which is rounding up the Fedayeen.

II. Political situation and diplomatic activity

Cairo

3. Following a day of consultation among the Arab Heads of State including King Hussein, and Arafat, an agreement was signed by all parties to end the fighting in Jordan. According to agency reports the agreement provides for:

- a) an immediate ceasefire;
- b) the creation of a "Higher Committee" under the chairmanship of the Tunisian Prime Minister to "supervise its implementation";
- c) the Jordanian Army and the guerillas to withdraw from

Amman and return to previously held positions;

- d) a return to civil rule in Irbid and other northern towns;
- e) the release of detainees on both sides.

If the agreement is violated, all Arab states are committed to take collective action to preserve the peace.

4. The Arab leaders have now dispersed.

III. Reactions outside Jordan

5. HM Ambassador was summoned to receive a note (Khartoum telsno. 546-7) warning that any outside intervention in Jordan would have very serious consequences.

IV. HM Embassy, Amman

6. Members of the staff are safe and well, although in some danger when venturing on the streets, particularly after dark. A stray bullet passed through the Registry window yesterday afternoon.

V. Evacuation

7. Twenty British nationals evacuated from Jordan will arrive in London from Beirut today. Three British subjects reported missing in Amman have not yet been found.

VI. Relief: ICRC plans

8. The ICRC have told our Consul-General (Geneva) that they accept our request that they should "act as a co-ordinator" of medical units (Geneva telno 65). They have asked us to fly in "medical units regardless of risks involved". They propose the following schedule for UK and US medical aid.

Tuesday, 29 September. Arrival in Amman of American medical unit or transportable hospital.

Wednesday, 30 September. Arrival of UK surgical team and one field hospital.

SE C R E T

Thursday, 1 October. Arrival of US surgical hospital.

9. They have asked us to confirm acceptance of this schedule. The ICRC while agreeing to co-ordinate medical aid have so far refused to accept that this should be "strictly" under their auspices. They will not arrange flight clearance with the Palestinians or Jordanian authorities, and have not agreed our flights with them, as they did in the case of the French. HM Consul-General expressed concern to the President of the ICRC about the organisation of British aid under ICRC aegis. The ICRC President, who was unable to clarify the situation, hoped to be able to spell out the conditions more exactly. We shall resolve this very soon.

Cargo-Lux aeroplane

10. This aeroplane is due to have left Manston aerodrome about 22.30 last night with 22 tons of material for relief in Jordan. It is expected that this will fly straight to Amman.

UK medical aid

11. The ICRC have informed us that it will not be necessary to evacuate casualties from Jordan to bases in Cyprus (Operation "Sheveller"). The casualties will be flown somewhere nearer, Syria or the Lebanon. Our aircraft assigned for CASEVAC will be used to ferry food supplies^{if}, as seems probable, it is not required for evacuating the wounded.

UK food aid

12. HM Ambassador Amman estimates a "starvation gap" of one week before local food supply routes will re-open.

13. We have arranged a shuttle service of supplies from Cyprus-Amman. Foodstuffs (flour, rice, beans etc) will be purchased locally or supplied from HQ AFNE (Cyprus). The flights will start today, if arrangements can be completed via CASEVAC aircraft.

US medical aid

14. The Americans plan to set up a large field hospital in Amman with supporting services. All personnel will be civilian. The first stage will be the arrival in Amman (scheduled for dawn today) of five Hercules aircraft from bases in the UK. A further 25 aircraft will leave Germany this evening, to reach Amman at dawn tomorrow.

UN food aid

15. IEM Embassy in Rome have suggested to the Director of the UN's World Food Programme (FAO) that nearby stocks at sea should be diverted to Jordan. The Director promised to reply to this suggestion early this morning.

VII. Hostages and Leila Khaled

16. Thirty-two out of the 38 American hostages were released in Amman early on the morning of 27 September and flown to Nicosia by a Swiss cargo plane. The UAR Embassy appear to have acted as intermediary in their release. Although confirmation is still awaited from IEM Embassy, Amman, the remaining six hostages are believed to have been freed, but pending vacation this morning / ^{their} precise whereabouts are unknown. It is thought they are being held by the Jordanian Army.

17. UK Ministers decided that they were willing to release Leila Khaled after the remaining six hostages had arrived safely outside Jordan: and that with the agreement of the UAR (since given) Miss Khaled would then be taken by RAF plane to Cairo. The German and Swiss Governments were informed that the aircraft could collect their detainees on the way, if they so wished (FCO telno 644 to Bonn).

18. Having first accepted this plan (Bonn telno 1134), the German Government later stated that they would participate only if the Americans were agreeable. After consultation with IEM Embassy, Washington, the Germans were told that the Americans had made no criticism of our plan and that if the Federal Government wanted more

positive assurances, they should pursue the matter in Washington. HMG intended to proceed with or without German participating, although we obviously hoped they will join us. An answer is expected from Bonn following a Cabinet meeting at 0200 hours today.

19. According to HM Embassy, Berne, the Swiss Government were in principle ready to cooperate in the return of their prisoners but feared that the handing over of the detainees to the UAR might provoke a hostile reaction from the PFLP. The Swiss were informed that the Egyptians had acted as negotiators for the release of the first 32 hostages and we did not anticipate any trouble from the PFLP.

20. Berne later reported by telephone that while the Swiss Cabinet favoured the deal, the Cantonal Government of Zurich opposed the release of the detainees. We expect to hear by mid-morning whether this conflict has been resolved.

21. In order that Miss Khaled can be despatched at the earliest opportunity and to reduce the risk of the Israelis submitting a request for her extradition before her departure (Tel Aviv telno 213), the RAF Comet will be placed on 3 hours standby wef 0700 hours at which time we may have news from Amman of the departure and destination of hostages.

RECEIVED IN REGISTRY No. 10
NEJ 1/10

Middle East crisis

SITREP at 0700 on 29 September 1970

(all times referred to are BST unless
otherwise stated)

I. The military situation

Amman

Jordanian Army officers were reported as considering that the Army had not won decisively enough.

2. Civilians, particularly women and children, appeared on the streets in the Amman suburbs clustering around water and food distribution vehicles. The Army made a concentrated effort to remove disabled and burnt-out vehicles. The airport and the northern road to it were open and British relief supplies arrived and were handed over to the Red Cross. No Fedayeen were seen.

General

3. There are indications that Army units are beginning to return to their peacetime locations. There were steady movements of tanks and other military vehicles southwards.

4. An Army spokesman said unattributably that the terrorists might establish themselves in Northern Jordan and that "such a situation could have special significance for Israel".

II. Political situation and diplomatic activity

5. King Hussein returned to Amman from the Arab summit in Cairo early on Monday, 28 September. His courage in having faced his accusers in Cairo is reported by I.E. Ambassador there to have done something to improve his standing.

6. Vice President Anwar Sadat announced on Cairo Radio at approximately 9 pm on 28 September that President Nasser had died

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some five hours previously. (Agency reports subsequently stated that President Nixon had suspended exercises by the US Sixth Fleet as a mark of respect; and that Prime Minister Kosygin would represent the Soviet Union at the funeral on Thursday, 1 October.)

7. The death of President Nasser did not in the view of HM Ambassador in Cairo affect the plan to deliver Leila Khaled and the six other prisoners there.

III. Reactions outside Jordan

8. The Israeli Ambassador sent a message to the FCO (from Blackpool) expressing concern at reports about the possible imminent release of Leila Khaled saying that the Israeli Government viewed her disposal in the terms of the Extradition Treaty between Israel and the UK. Arrangements have been made for the Ambassador to call on the Permanent Under Secretary at 9.15 am today.

9. The Swiss Government issued a communiqué anticipating a happy outcome of the hostages crisis.

IV. HM Embassy, Amman

10. Members of the staff are safe.

V. Evacuation

11. Nothing to report.

VI. Relief

12. HM Ambassador in Amman reports relief requirements will be for food and general nursing rather than surgery.

UK food aid

13. Some 38 tons of British supplies from Cyprus and the UK arrived in Jordan yesterday and were handed to the Red Cross. Further supplies, amounting in total to about 80 tons, will arrive from HQ BFNE once a day until and including Thursday, 1 October.

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S E C R E T

We shall review the need for further consignments after 1 October in the light of the supply route situation.

UK medical aid

14. As there are no longer plans to evacuate casualties from Jordan to Cyprus, operation SHOVELLER has been revised and become a plan to ferry medical aid from Cyprus to Jordan. If there are facilities for unloading vehicles in Amman from civil freight aircraft (although this is reported unlikely) it is hoped to fly in a field ambulance and three ambulance land Rovers today.

15. RAF aircraft would bring in a field surgical team and part of a field hospital tomorrow, 30 September. Clearance for these RAF flights has been requested. All personnel involved will be in civilian dress and attached to DA's staff. They will be enrolled in the British Red Cross in Cyprus so as to give them additional recognition and protection once in Jordan. We shall share a partially built Jordanian military hospital 7 miles west of Amman with the Americans. A 50-bed French field hospital has been established in Amman.

US medical aid

16. The US Government have decided to take up the ICRC's offer to act as co-ordinator for their medical teams. One field hospital has arrived in Amman and another is due there today.

UN food aid

17. The World Food Programme officials in Rome have plans to take supplies to Jordan from stocks in the UAR, Lebanon and Turkey. There are no nearby cargoes at sea.

Israeli food aid

18. It has been reported that 145 tons of food provided by the

/Israel

Israel Government entered Jordan on 27 September.

Arab Relief Committee

19. This has been set up under the chairmanship of King Faisal. We have offered to inform him of our plans to help Jordan both unilaterally and as part of any international effort and have asked to be kept informed of progress by his Committee.

Arms replacement

20. HM Ambassador, Amman received a very substantial "shopping list" for arms and military vehicles on which he is seeking clarification from King Hussein.

VII. Hostages/prisoners and Leila Khaled

21. A UAR Embassy official in Amman told HM Embassy that the six hostages were safe and well in a house outside Amman but he subsequently admitted that he had lost contact with the captors.

22. HM Ambassador in Cairo was told by the UAR authorities that they thought that the six had left Amman. HM Embassy in Amman on rechecking with the Egyptian Embassy there found that the Red Cross had been asked to provide transport to where the hostages were believed to be held outside Amman at 3.30 pm local time on 28 September. The Egyptian Embassy subsequently told the British Embassy that the six remaining hostages were being held at some distance from Amman and that it would not after all be possible to move them on 28 September. They hoped to bring them to Amman early on 29 September.

23. While the Egyptians emphasised that the six were being released unconditionally, they said that the PFLP expected HMG to exert pressure on Israel for the release of the two Algerians being held there, since they had been taken off a British aircraft. The

/PFLP

PFLP also expected Israel to release 12 Fedayeen being held in Israel.

24. The text of a press announcement to be issued by the British Government at the time of the release of Leila Khaled was cleared with HM Ambassadors concerned.

25. The Governments of the Federal German Republic and Switzerland agreed that the three Fedayeen prisoners held by each of them should be put aboard the RAF Comet carrying Leila Khaled (at Munich and Zurich) en route to Cairo. The Germans sent their three prisoners to Munich.

26. The Swiss Government asked that the RAF Comet should stage at Dubendorf military airport (near Zurich) rather than at the civil airport. Ministry of Defence are in touch with the Air Attaché in HM Embassy, Berne about landing conditions at that airport (Berne telno 349 of 28 September to FCO repeated to MOD).

27. The Swiss Government suggested that, once the present crisis is finally resolved, the Berne Group should consider what action might be taken with Arab Governments to deter further hijacking by terrorists.

28. Members of the Arguello family told HM Consul-General Geneva that they wished eventually to repatriate to Managua the body of their deceased hijacker relative.

S E C R E T

RECEIVED IN
REGISTRY No. 10

Middle East crisis

CITREP at 0700 on 30 September 1970

(all times referred to are BST unless
otherwise stated)

NET 1/10

I. The military situation

Amman

Civilians were moving freely on foot yesterday but there were no civilian cars in the streets. Shooting had stopped. The Army were distributing food and civil defence vehicles were issuing water.

2. Jordan Army sources admitted that Army intelligence had grossly underestimated the strength, determination and defences of the Fedayeen but that the Army could now deal with them if the ceasefire were broken.

North Jordan

3. Irbid was still controlled by Fedayeen, King Hussein having given orders that the Army should not perpetrate there the destruction which it had done in Amman. Elsewhere in the north, the Army were in control.

II. Political situation and diplomatic activity

King Hussein

4. HM Ambassador, Amman saw King Hussein for some 40 minutes (see telex conference 1640Z 29 September). The King stressed the need for Britain and the US to meet his military requirements as urgently as possible, particularly the supply of ammunition.

5. On the Cairo Summit, the King said that he had not really been reconciled with Arafat whom he regarded as "a criminal". But fortunately there were other Palestinian leaders with whom the King

/felt

felt he could work. He said that he was prepared to accord a separate political status to the Palestinians even before a settlement with Israel.

6. The King said that he proposed to cooperate fully with the conciliation committee which was working under the Tunisian Prime Minister.

7. King Hussein sent a personal message of gratitude to the Secretary of State (Amman telno 708).

The Israeli Ambassador

3. The Ambassador yesterday called at his own request on the Permanent Under Secretary who told him that if the six remaining hostages in Jordan reached safety, the Israelis could assume from what had been said publicly that it was likely that the seven Fedayeen prisoners in Europe would be freed (FCO telno 442 to Tel Aviv). Speaking without instructions, the Ambassador rehearsed what he was confident was his Government's position on the Anglo-Israeli Extradition Treaty, particularly that under Article 10 of the Treaty their request for the provisional arrest of Miss Khaleel was maintained. Her release could not be reconciled with the operation of the Treaty.

III. UK relief to Jordan

9. The airlift of food and medical supplies by HMG in eight Argosy and two Hercules aircraft of the RAF, as well as two civilian CL 44 aircraft on charter, from Akrotiri to Amman began in the early hours of 30 September. Clearances were obtained for the aircraft to overfly the Lebanon and Syria using ICRC call signs and markings. The airlift initially is carrying 120 British service personnel who will render medical and signals assistance. They will be unarmed, dressed in civilian clothes and enrolled with the ICRC. Thirty-six tons of foodstuffs were flown into Amman yesterday from

S E C R E T

Cyprus.

IV. Hostages/Prisoners (including Leila Khaled)

10. In a telex conference with the FCO at 5.40 pm on 29 September, HM Ambassador reported that the six remaining hostages had just been brought under Egyptian Embassy/ICRC auspices from Irbid to the Muashir hospital (ICRC headquarters) in Amman. He reported subsequently (Amman telno 716) that the Americans planned to fly the six from Amman to Athens by charter "Caravelle" early this morning, 30 September, arriving in Athens at 9.30 am.

11. Miss Khaled's journey to Cairo by RAF "Comet" will, it is estimated, take about nine and a half hours including the scheduled stops at Munich and Zurich where the German and Swiss Governments have six Fedayeen prisoners ready to go aboard the RAF 'plane.

12. The Defence Attaché in HM Embassy, Amman saw the six hostages boarding an MEA aircraft at 6.40 am this morning, 30 September as planned with destination Athens. Short of some technical hitch the aircraft should arrive in Athens at 9.30 am.



27

13/10

with compliments and thanks.

Mr Long

R.E. 12/10

Private Secretary to the
CHANCELLOR OF THE DUCHY OF LANCASTER
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
Downing Street London SW1
Telephone 01-930 8440

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RECEIVED IN REGISTRY No. 10
NE 51/10

Mr. Battiscombe

(LAST PAPER)

Cabinet: Jordan

-- I attach this morning's SITREP about the situation in
Jordan and the return to Cairo of Leila Khaled together with six
Fedayeen prisoners who had been held in West Germany and
-- Switzerland. Also attached is a note about emergency aid supplied
to Jordan by IMG.

2. For this morning's Cabinet meeting, the Chancellor of the
Duchy of Lancaster may like to know that the main points are:-

a) the remaining six American hostages having reached
Nicosia early on 30 September, arrangements were made to return
Leila Khaled to Cairo in an RAF Comet picking up the three
Fedayeen detainees from Munich and a further three from Zurich en
route. Take-off from RAF Lyneham was delayed until 9 pm BST
because of initial Egyptian reluctance for administrative reasons
to receive the released detainees in Cairo until after the
funeral of President Nasser. They were in fact delivered into
Egyptian hands at approximately 7 am this morning;

b) the security situation in Jordan is slowly returning to
normal with the King, supported by the Army, generally in control.
The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary plans to have talks with
King Hussein during his visit to Cairo for the funeral of
President Nasser;

c) IMG made the first contribution of emergency aid to
Jordan when 2½ tons of medical supplies including quantities of
blood plasma were flown to Amman by civil aircraft on 23 September.


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(LAST PAPER)

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This prompt assistance appears to have been appreciated. Meanwhile, the British airlift has continued. On 30 September, eight Argosy and two Hercules aircraft of the RAF, as well as two civil CL 44 charter aircraft, flew in further supplies including 128 personnel and 9 vehicles for the establishment of a field hospital. The services personnel are unarmed, in civilian clothes and under the auspices of the Red Cross. Further medical supplies and food will be flown in from Cyprus as required.


(J. de C. Ling)
Emergency Unit
1 October 1970

copied to: Private Secretary
Mr. Renwick
Mr. Daunt
Sir P. Adams
Mr. Tripp

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Middle East crisis

SITREP at 0700 on 1 October 1970

(all times referred to are BST
unless otherwise stated)

I. The military situation

All quiet, Army generally in control. Two squadrons of Centurion tanks and some armoured cars have established themselves near the British and US military field hospitals. British service personnel are safe and well protected (see para. 7 below).

2. Life in Amman is slowly improving; although food distribution appears to be uneven. Some local staff of IEL Embassy reported

II. Political situation and diplomatic activity

3. Foreign representatives and large numbers of Egyptians have been collecting in Cairo for the funeral of President Nasser today. The Egyptian authorities initially asked that the RAF Comet returning the seven Fedayeen detainees (including Leila Khaleel) should not arrive in Cairo until after President Nasser's funeral (Cairo telno 1105 to FCO). Following representations by IEL Ambassador, the Egyptian authorities subsequently agreed that the Comet should after all land in Cairo and discharge the seven Fedayeen this morning (1 October).

4. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary, accompanied by Mr. George Brown, arrived in Cairo at approximately 8 pm BST yesterday evening to attend the funeral of President Nasser. While in Cairo he plans to talk to King Hussein (FCO telno 997 to Cairo).

/Amman

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5. The official of the UAR Embassy who conducted the last six American hostages from Irbid into ICRC hands on 29 September called yesterday on the Counsellor of HM Embassy and presented him with a list of 56 Arab nationals whose release the PFLP expected in return for the 56 hostages recently released from the hijacked airliners (the PFLP list included the 7 Fedayeen now returned to Cairo by RAF Comet). The Egyptian official alleged that the PFLP had been assured, by the PFLP, that the hostages would be released in return for the 56 Arab nationals. (Tel Aviv telno 935 to FCO). (Washington telno 2900 to FCO).

Tel Aviv

6. HM Ambassador reports that King Hussein is thought in Israel partly to have restored his political position. The Israelis have also drawn the moral that the King has demonstrated his ability to use his Army against the Fedayeen and that he could not expect Israel in future to accept his professed military impotence as an excuse to tolerate Fedayeen attacks on Israel. Nor has the King's suggestion that the Fedayeen should now concentrate on their proper role of fighting Israel escaped attention (Tel Aviv telno 935 to FCO).

III. Aid to Jordan by HMG

7. Operation AMVERMIL began in the early hours of 30 September with an airlift of 120 tons of food supplies to Amman with 120 medical and signal personnel from service units in Cyprus. The initial lift included 1 vehicle to operate a field hospital and field ambulance section. We plan that they should remain in Amman for about three weeks. A further five aircraft flights are projected for today and three tomorrow; and the airlift will

continue as required.

IV. Hostages/Prisoners (including Leila Khaled)

8. The last six hostages arrived by civil charter aircraft in Nicosia at about 9 am EST on 30 September on their way to Athens and New York.

9. Arrangements were put in hand for the transfer of Leila Khaled from Ealing police station to RAF Lyneham. Her transfer was delayed pending confirmation by the Egyptian authorities that they would receive her together with the six Fedayeen detainees from West Germany and Switzerland on the night of 30 September/1 October. They had indicated to IEM Ambassador early yesterday that they wished to defer the return of the detainees until after President Masser's funeral and were prepared publicly to explain their administrative reasons for any such delay. In the event, however, following strong representations by HM Ambassador, the Egyptians agreed to take delivery of the released detainees from aboard the RAF Comet which landed in Cairo at approximately 7 am, having taken off from Munich at 11.50 pm and ^{from} Zurich 2.07 am (at precisely the times notified to the Federal German and Swiss authorities) taking aboard the other six Fedayeen.

10. Details of the release of Leila Khaled and her delivery to Cairo with the six other Fedayeen were released to the press from No. 10. The statement referred to the participation by the UAR Government in the negotiations for the release by the PFLP of their hostages. The exchanges between HMG and the UAR Government have been highlighted by commentators in London and Cairo.

11. Arrangements are in hand for the delivery of the body of
/the dead

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the dead American hijacker, Arguello, to his family.

Footnote

The Jordan Emergency Unit will close at 9 am BST on 1 October having noted the latest appreciation of authoritative military sources in Amman:

"It seems pretty clear that the recent fighting has changed the overall picture remarkably little, except, of course, that both sides must obviously have much less ammunition than when they started."

Jordan Emergency Unit

Foreign & Commonwealth Office.

1 October 1970

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UNCLASSIFIED

Jordan: Emergency assistance by HMG

Medical supplies

Two and a half tons of medical supplies (including 680 bottles of blood plasma) were flown to Amman by civilian aircraft on 23 September. So far as we know, this was the first consignment to reach Amman.

2. A further 22 tons of medical supplies were flown from the UK to Amman on 27 September by civilian charter aircraft.

Foodstuffs

3. In response to HM Ambassador's appeal on 27 September to help meet the "starvation gap" which he thought might last for a week until normal supply channels were reopened, four aircraft-loads of food (totalling about 80 tons) have been flown from Cyprus to Amman. This consisted of whatever was available and suitable from services' stocks supplemented by supplies bought locally.

4. All medical and food supplies have been consigned to the Coordinating Committee of the ICRC in Amman.

Personnel

5. On 30 September the Ministry of Defence flew in 128 personnel and 9 vehicles to operate a field hospital and field ambulance section. The field hospital will function in a partially completed military hospital near Wadi Sir. It is anticipated that these units will need to remain in Amman for about three weeks.

Jordan Emergency Unit

Foreign & Commonwealth Office.

1 October 1970

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F L A S H FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
TELEGRAM NUMBER 997

TO CAIRO

30 SEPTEMBER 1970

SECRET 301741Z

ADDRESSED TO CAIRO TELEGRAM NUMBER 997 OF 30 SEPTEMBER 1970.
REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO AMMAN BEIRUT WASHINGTON ^{CONTROL} POINT.

YOUR TELEGRAM NO. 1110 (NOT TO ALL).

FOLLOWING FOR GRAHAM ON ARRIVAL.

SECRETARY OF STATE'S MEETINGS WITH KING HUSSEIN AND RIAD.

THERE ARE NO SPECIAL POINTS WHICH WE WOULD WISH THE SECRETARY OF STATE TO RAISE WITH KING HUSSEIN WHEN THEY MEET TOMORROW. THE SECRETARY OF STATE WILL NO DOUBT REFER TO THE PERSONAL MESSAGES WHICH HE AND THE PRIME MINISTER HAVE EXCHANGED WITH KING HUSSEIN DURING THE RECENT TROUBLES AND CONGRATULATE THE KING ON THE AGREEMENT SIGNED IN CAIRO ON 27 SEPTEMBER.

2. KING HUSSEIN MAY RAISE THE QUESTION OF SUPPLIES OF ARMS AND AMMUNITION, AND THE QUOTE SHOPPING LIST UNQUOTE WHICH WAS GIVEN TO OUR AMBASSADOR IN AMMAN ON 27 SEPTEMBER. THE SECRETARY OF STATE COULD REPLY THAT WE ARE STUDYING THIS URGENTLY IN LONDON AND HOPE TO BE ABLE TO GIVE SOME POSITIVE RESPONSE IN THE NEAR FUTURE. WE WERE GLAD TO LEARN THAT THE AMERICANS ARE BEGINNING TO FLY IN AMMUNITION ETC. TOMORROW OR ON FRIDAY IN RESPONSE TO THE KING'S LIST OF REQUIREMENTS.

3. IF THE KING MENTIONS THE SECURITY OF HIS FAMILY IN ENGLAND, THE SECRETARY OF STATE COULD REASSURE THE KING THAT WE HAVE ARRANGED THE EXTRA PROTECTION WHICH HE ASKED SHOULD BE GIVEN THEM.

4. ON RELIEF AND REHABILITATION FOR JORDAN, THE SECRETARY OF STATE MIGHT SAY THAT WE WERE GLAD TO HAVE BEEN FIRST IN THE FIELD WITH THE INTERNATIONAL EFFORT TO PROVIDE MEDICAL SUPPLIES AND FOOD.

SUBSEQUENTLY, WE HAD, AS THE KING WILL KNOW, FLOWN IN TODAY TO AMMAN

A FIELD AMBULANCE, A FIELD HOSPITAL AND A FIELD SURGICAL UNIT. THESE ARE ALREADY HARD AT WORK. WE HAVE ALSO BEEN CONSIDERING HOW WE MIGHT BE ABLE TO HELP WITH THE LONGER TERM REHABILITATION AND RECONSTRUCTION EFFORT WHICH THE JORDANIANS WILL NO DOUBT NOW BE ORGANISING. WE HOPE TO SEND EXPERTS TO AMMAN SHORTLY TO DISCUSS WITH THE JORDANIANS WHAT WE CAN DO TO HELP IN THIS FIELD.

5. SIR R BEAUMONT WILL NO DOUBT WISH TO SUGGEST SOME POINTS TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR HIS MEETING WITH RIAD. WE THINK THAT IT WOULD BE HELPFUL IF THE SECRETARY OF STATE WERE TO EMPHASISE:

- (A) THAT HMG'S CONCERN TO HELP PROMOTE A SETTLEMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SCR 242 IS AS GREAT AS EVER.
- (B) THAT WE WILL BE GLAD TO DISCUSS WITH THE EGYPTIANS AT ANY TIME HOW BEST TO WORK TO THIS END:
- (C) THAT, WHILE WE RECOGNISE THAT UNTIL THE NEW EGYPTIAN PRESIDENT HAS BEEN INSTALLED IT WILL BE DIFFICULT FOR ANY PROGRESS TO BE MADE, WE HOPE THAT AS LITTLE TIME AS POSSIBLE WILL BE LOST IN ENABLING JARRING TO RESUME HIS DISCUSSIONS.
- (D) THAT THE CEASEFIRE/STANDSTILL AGREEMENT IS AN INDISPENSABLE BASIS FOR JARRING'S EFFORTS AND THAT WE EARNESTLY HOPE THAT ALL THE PARTIES TO IT WILL OBSERVE IT.

DOUGLAS-HOME